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Abstract 
Consider the following: A Jews-for-Jesus bulletin reports, 
falsely, that a Jewish woman became “a believer in the tenets, the 
actions, and the philosophy of Jews for Jesus.” Does this 
publication constitute defamation? Should defamatoriness be 
determined in accordance with the views of the general non-
Jewish community, with those of the Jewish minority, or with a 
normative ethical commitment? Our Article aims to provide the 
answers.  
Part I demonstrates that the definition of defamatoriness in 
common law jurisdictions is essentially empirical and 
distinguishes between the two leading tests—the English test and 
the American test. Part II.A describes the English, or general 
community test, whereby a statement is defamatory if considered 
so by the “right thinking members of the public at large.” Part II.B 
details the American, or sectorial test, whereby a statement is 
defamatory if considered so by a substantial and respectable 
minority. A third possible empirical test, whereby the defamatory 
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potential of a statement may be tested within a small group, has 
not been adopted in any jurisdiction. 
Part III, however, demonstrates that the small group test is 
an economically preferable option to both the English and 
American tests. Part III conducts two separate economic analyses 
of the alternative empirical tests for defamation. First, we study 
the relationship between the view of the community and the views 
of the individuals who comprise the community. We show that the 
defamation cases should be decided according to the unanimity 
rule: A statement may be considered defamatory only when all 
individuals in the relevant community consider it so. Because this 
rule is implausible except in the case of the small group test, it 
suggests that both the English and American tests lack a solid 
theoretical foundation. Second, we study the costs and benefits 
associated with the various tests and find that the American 
sectorial test is no longer optimal. As a result, we argue that it is 
preferable to adopt the small group test when deciding cases of 
defamation. 
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I. Introduction 
A Jews for Jesus bulletin publishes a report, falsely implying 
that a Jewish woman became “a believer in the tenets, the 
actions, and the philosophy of Jews for Jesus.”1 Does this 
publication constitute defamation? What makes a statement 
defamatory? Should a statement be deemed defamatory if it 
prejudiced the plaintiff in the eyes of a respectable minority, such 
as the American-Jewish community? Should a statement be held 
defamatory only if it prejudiced the plaintiff in the eyes of the 
average non-Jewish American or the “common mind?”2 Or should 
a statement be examined regardless of actual perceptions, 
through the prism of a normative ethical commitment? This 
Article aims to provide answers to these questions. 
The tort of defamation emerged in common law courts in the 
sixteenth century and quickly gained in popularity3—so much so 
that according to contemporary scholars, “[N]o area of the law 
excites more interest, or controversy, than the law of 
defamation.”4 In the past fifty years, there has been an explosion 
of interest in this area as the result of a set of Supreme Court 
decisions that have imposed additional requirements on plaintiffs 
to comport with the dictates of the First Amendment.5 
                                                                                                     
 1. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1101 (Fla. 2008). 
 2. Id. at 1114. 
 3. See ROBERT E. KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1145 (3d ed. 1998) (explaining that libel developed separately from 
slander in the Star Chamber until common law courts assumed jurisdiction over 
all tort actions when the Star Chamber was abolished). 
 4. MARK LUNNEY & KEN OLIPHANT, TORT LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 704 
(4th ed. 2010). 
 5. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (refusing to 
extend the actual malice standard to private individuals seeking to collect 
damages for defamatory falsehoods); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 
156 (1967) (determining that a public figure may recover damages for 
defamation if the falsehood poses a “substantial danger to reputation” and 
arises from the defendant’s “extreme departure from the standards of 
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers”); 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (requiring public officials 
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Unfortunately, as the scholarly debate has shifted to address the 
new constitutional requirements (falsity and fault), the long-
standing elements of the common law tort of defamation have 
been neglected.6 Although our analysis is not entirely 
disconnected from the modern changes in defamation law, our 
focus is on one of the traditional common law requirements. 
The first and primary element of this cause of action is that 
the defendant’s statement be defamatory,7 that is, potentially 
harmful to the plaintiff’s reputation. A statement is defamatory if 
it is “calculated to injure the reputation of another, by exposing 
him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule”8 or, more broadly, if it 
“tend[s] to lower the plaintiff in the estimation” of others,9 even if 
the statement is not actually believed or if it does not disclose 
previously unpublicized information so that no harm is caused.10 
                                                                                                     
who bring a libel action against critics of their official conduct to prove that the 
defendant acted with actual malice). 
 6. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of 
Community, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1996) (“For the past thirty-one years, 
scholars have largely neglected some of defamation’s most basic inquiries, 
choosing to bask in the ‘sunny warmth of the first amendment’ . . . .” (quoting 
William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery from the 
Press, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV 793, 793 (1984))). 
 7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977) (listing the elements 
required to establish a cause of action for defamation). 
 8. Parmiter v. Coupland, (1840) 151 Eng. Rep. 340 (Exch.) 342; 6 M. & W. 
105, 108; see also Thornton v. Tel. Media Grp. Ltd., [2010] EWHC (QB) 1414, 
[28] (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2010/ 
1414.html (quoting Parmiter, 151 Eng. Rep. at 342 as the “classic definition” of 
defamatory). 
 9. Sim v. Stretch, [1936] 2 All Eng. Rep. 1237 (H.L.) 1240 (Eng.); see also 
Thornton, [2010] EWHC (QB) 1414 [28] (recognizing that Sim broadened the 
classic definition of defamation to encompass views beyond a specific person or 
class of persons); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (endorsing the 
use of community views to determine a statement’s defamatory character); 
Lidsky, supra note 6, at 12–13, 44 (recognizing that a defamatory statement 
must have a “tendency to harm reputation”). 
 10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. d (1977) (establishing 
that a statement’s defamatory character does not depend on the presence of 
actual harm, but instead upon the statement’s potential to harm reputation). 
There is a difference between determining whether a statement is defamatory, 
which does not require harm, and determining whether a cause of action arises, 
because some types of defamation are actionable only if harm is established. 
Lidsky, supra note 6, at 12–13, 44. 
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The inquiry involves two cumulative steps.11 In the interpretive 
step, the court must determine exactly what the statement 
attributes to the plaintiff.12 In the evaluative step, the court must 
determine whether the statement, as properly interpreted and 
understood, has the tendency to harm the plaintiff’s reputation.13 
This Article focuses on the evaluative component.14 In particular, 
we ask a very specific question: should the potential effect on the 
plaintiff’s estimation be tested through the eyes of society at large 
or through those of a particular segment of the community to 
which the plaintiff belongs?15 If the latter, should the law 
differentiate between segments based on their size and 
importance?16 Of course, this type of inquiry assumes that the 
defamatory character of a statement, or “defamatoriness,”17 is 
determined by the actual perceptions of people within a legally 
relevant group (an empirical test), not through the lens of a 
judicial ethical commitment (a normative test).18  
                                                                                                     
 11. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 11 (distinguishing the two stages); J.M. 
Burchell, The Criteria of Defamation, 91 S. AFR. L.J. 178, 178 (1974) (same). 
 12. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 11 (describing the main inquiry in the 
interpretive stage as “whether the words [used by the defendant] will bear the 
‘spin’ that plaintiff is seeking to put on them” (quoting MARC A. FRANKLIN & 
DAVID A. ANDERSON, MASS MEDIA LAW 200 (5th ed. 1995))). 
 13. See id. (explaining that the evaluative step considers the community’s 
attitudes and beliefs to assess the statement’s tendency to harm). 
 14. However, our theoretical analysis may have some bearing on the 
interpretive step as well because interpretation may raise the question of 
“meaning in the eyes of whom?” 
 15. See Michael J. Tommaney, Community Standards of Defamation, 34 
ALB. L. REV. 634, 641 (1970) (“The problem of determining what segment of the 
community should be used as the standard for judging whether a 
communication is defamatory . . . [has] been vexing to the courts.”). 
 16. A related question is whether an empirical test should be subject to 
external public policy constraints. See Note, Developments in the Law of 
Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 886–87 (1956) (discussing public policy 
constraints on empirical tests). 
 17. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 9 (referring to whether a statement is 
defamatory or not as the “defamatoriness inquiry”). 
 18. See id. (“[T]he underlying question is whether the defamatoriness 
inquiry should focus on actual community values and prejudices or whether, as 
it currently does, the inquiry should impose normative restrictions on what 
values it will recognize.”). 
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The Article discusses these matters from a novel theoretical 
perspective. Yet, the theory is not developed in the abstract. We 
aspire to settle real and practically significant legal dilemmas. 
Our starting point must therefore be doctrinal. We will show that 
in Anglo-American caselaw, two empirical tests, subject to some 
normative threshold, constitute the dominant competing 
standards for defamatoriness. The critical appraisal of these tests 
will lead to a constructive proposal. While our arguments are 
relevant to all common law jurisdictions and beyond, we focus 
primarily on the United States and therefore discuss the relevant 
developments in American constitutional law. 
Part II systematically analyzes Anglo-American caselaw.19 
There is no consensus among common law jurisdictions 
concerning the proper test for determining whether a statement 
is defamatory.20 It is prudent to maintain, however, that the 
American position is somewhat different from the traditional 
English one.21 Part II thus distinguishes between the two leading 
tests for defamation.22 Subpart A shows that many courts in 
England and in the British Commonwealth, broadly defined, have 
embraced the notion that the views of the community as a whole 
should be considered (hereinafter “the general community 
test”).23 Subpart B shows that the leading view in the United 
States has been that the defamatory potential may be empirically 
tested within a specific group, namely, a substantial and 
respectable minority (hereinafter “the sectorial test”).24 A third 
                                                                                                     
 19. See infra Part II (incorporating the approaches taken by Irish and 
Australian courts into the analysis of American and English case law). 
 20. Cf. Roy Baker, Defamation and the Moral Community, 13 DEAKIN L. 
REV. 1, 4 (2008) (explaining that Australia’s common law offers various tests for 
assessing a statement’s defamatory character). 
 21. See Tommaney, supra note 15, at 635 (distinguishing between the 
English courts’ focus on the general community to assess a statement’s 
defamatory character from the “important and respectable group in the 
community” utilized by the U.S. courts). 
 22. See infra Part II (recognizing that American courts utilized the 
traditional English test until the sectorial test arose as the prevailing approach 
in the early twentieth century). 
 23. See infra Part II.A (explaining that, in addition to empirical data, the 
general community test utilizes a normative threshold that assesses a 
statement’s defamatory character according to prevailing public policy). 
 24. See infra Part II.B (stating that American courts generally eschew 
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possible approach, whereby the defamatory potential of a 
statement may be tested within a small group (hereinafter “the 
small group test”), has not been adopted in any jurisdiction, and 
will not be presented in Part II. We mention it here for two 
reasons. First, we wish to provide a fuller picture of the available 
alternatives. Each of the three empirical definitions sets a 
different size of the minimal group in which the impact of the 
statement may be tested, and each can be represented as a point 
or a range on a continuum.25 Second, the Article ultimately 
advocates the third approach. The fact that it is a neglected and 
unexplored alternative highlights this Article’s contribution to 
legal theory. Lastly, for the sake of completeness, subpart C 
discusses purely normative (non-empirical) tests for defamation, 
while recognizing that they are not common.26 
Figure 1 
 
Part III provides two economic analyses of the competing 
tests for defamation.27 It first connects the analysis in Part II 
with a theoretical argument employed in our earlier papers on 
the role of community standards in tort and contract law.28 The 
                                                                                                     
empirical data to establish the viewpoints of the relevant group and instead 
favor utilizing common knowledge of the group’s values). 
 25. Infra Figure 1. 
 26. See infra Part II.C (distinguishing the purely normative test’s 
concentration on subjective ethical principles from the general community and 
sectorial tests’ concern for potential harm to the plaintiff’s reputation). 
 27. See infra Part III (employing the community standards model and the 
cost–benefit analysis to demonstrate the theoretical and practical implications 
of each test). 
 28. See generally Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, Good Faith Performance, 
98 IOWA L. REV. 689 (2013) [hereinafter Miller & Perry, Good Faith] (critiquing 
the use of community standards to asses good faith performance between 
contracting parties); Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 
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theoretical argument can be summarized as follows: First, 
community standards are derived from individual standards. 
Second, the derivation method should (a) respect unanimous 
agreements, (b) change with individual beliefs, (c) treat 
individuals equally, and (d) not make ex ante distinctions 
between potentially defamatory statements. Third, it should 
always be possible to make a nondefamatory statement. We then 
use a theorem from a branch of economics known as social choice 
theory to show that, as a consequence, the community standard 
should consider a statement to be defamatory if, and only if, all 
individuals in the community consider it so.29 We argue that this 
theorem poses a serious problem for the application of community 
standards in general. However, in the case of defamation law, 
there is an important twist: the problem is much more severe in 
the case of the English general community standard than in that 
of the American sectorial standard. In fact, if the sectorial 
standard is taken to its logical extreme, so that a statement only 
need be considered defamatory among a very small (and possibly 
singular) group of people, then the problem posed by this theorem 
disappears entirely. 
Next, Part III offers a cost–benefit analysis of the 
alternatives.30 It shows that there are reasons, separate from our 
theorem, to prefer the American sectorial test to the English 
general community test, as well as to prefer a small group test to 
both. A particularly clear example is what we call the strategic 
action problem.31 Many individuals value their reputation within 
a very small group, such as their work colleagues or relatives, or 
among specific individuals, such as their employer or their 
                                                                                                     
N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 324 (2012) [hereinafter Miller & Perry, Reasonable Person] 
(advancing a reasonable person standard in tort law based upon “normative 
ethical commitment[s]” rather than the “empirically observed practice or 
profession”). 
 29. See infra Part III.A (addressing the theoretical problems that arise 
from quantitative constraints encompassed within the general community and 
sectorial tests). 
 30. See infra Part III.B (analyzing how different sizes of the relevant 
community under each test pose separate practical costs). 
 31. See infra Part III.B (recognizing that, under the strategic action 
problem, the harm to the plaintiff arises from the value placed on the relevant 
community rather than the size of such community). 
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spouse. A person who wishes to harm one of these individuals 
may strategically disseminate a false statement that is 
defamatory only within the relevant small group, without fear of 
liability under either of the American or English tests. This 
problem is more severe under the English test; in that case a 
person may strategically disseminate a false, defamatory 
statement only within a substantial and respectable minority 
without fear of legal consequence. 
Despite these difficulties, we do not claim that American 
courts should have adopted the small group test. It too, has its 
costs: publishers do not always know, and cannot be expected to 
know, whether a statement is defamatory within every small 
group that exists in a large and heterogeneous society. Liability 
in this case could have a chilling effect, leading to a decrease in 
the quantity and quality of published material.32 Consequently, 
we do not criticize the choice of American courts to adopt the 
sectorial test. Admittedly, the sectorial test suffers from both the 
possibility of strategic action and the chilling effect. However, the 
strategic action problem is much less severe than in the case of 
the general community test, and the chilling effect is much less 
severe than in the case of the small group test. Within the 
constraints of common law defamation, this choice may have 
constituted the optimal tradeoff between these two concerns. 
American defamation law has changed substantially since 
the adoption of the sectorial test. The most important change, for 
our purposes, is the fault requirement established in Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc.33 We argue that Gertz should be interpreted as 
allowing liability only if the defendant was aware, or had reason 
to be aware, that the statement was defamatory.34 Under this 
interpretation, the fault requirement counterbalances the chilling 
                                                                                                     
 32. See infra Part III.B (establishing that the chilling effect encompasses 
both the risk of defamation liability and the costs required to assess a 
statement’s potentially defamatory character). 
 33. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (“We hold 
that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define 
for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or 
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”). 
 34. This position is consistent with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 580B (1977). 
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effect. As a result of this change, the sectorial test is no longer 
optimal. We show that it would be preferable to adopt the small 
group test because it is consistent with the goals of current 
defamation law, it is easier to apply in difficult cases, and it is 
economically efficient. 
II. The Competing Theories 
A. The General Community Test 
1. The Principle 
According to the first theory of defamation, which we refer to 
interchangeably as the general community test or the English 
position, a statement is defamatory if considered so by the 
general community.35 While this definition is a slight 
oversimplification of contemporary legal reality in England, as we 
demonstrate below, it captures a significant portion of the 
traditional English stance. One of the most renowned 
enunciations of the general community test may be found in 
Tolley v. J.S. Fry & Sons, Ltd.36 The defendant, a chocolate 
manufacturer, advertised its products in national newspapers.37 
The ad included a caricature showing the plaintiff, a famous 
amateur golfer, and his caddie carrying the defendant’s 
chocolate.38 The plaintiff brought an action for defamation, 
contending that the ad implied that “he had prostituted his 
reputation as an amateur golf player for advertising purposes” 
and “had been guilty of conduct unworthy of his status as an 
amateur golfer.”39 Witnesses for the plaintiff testified that if an 
amateur golfer participated in advertising, his reputation as an 
amateur would be damaged, and his membership in any 
                                                                                                     
 35. See Tommaney, supra note 15, at 635 (“The rule in England is that the 
communication in question must tend to defame the plaintiff in the eyes of the 
general community, . . . rather than in the eyes of any particular segment of the 
community.”). 
 36. [1930] 1 K.B. 467 (Eng.), rev’d, [1931] A.C. 333 (H.L). 
 37. Id. at 467. 
 38. Id. at 468. 
 39. Id. at 468, 479, 483. 
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reputable club would be revoked.40 The Court of Appeal of 
England established that a statement is not defamatory even if it 
affects the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a section of the 
community, such as amateur athletes, unless it amounts to 
“disparagement of his reputation in the eyes of right thinking 
men generally” or “in the eyes of the average right thinking 
man.”41 
The Tolley doctrine seems to have two components: an 
empirical test—focusing on the views of the general community, 
and some sort of a normative threshold (“right thinking,” 
“reasonable,” etc.). The interplay between the two components 
has generated discussion and some controversy in caselaw and 
academic literature, but courts still rely, at least de jure, on the 
judgments of society at large to determine what constitutes a 
defamatory statement. Accordingly, one of England’s leading 
treatises on the subject deduced from Tolley that “[t]he views of 
the community as a whole must be considered; an imputation of 
conduct which is merely distasteful or objectionable according to 
the notions of certain people is not defamatory.”42 
A relatively recent authority to this effect is Arab News 
Network v. Al Khazen,43 which interestingly corresponds with 
contemporary events in Syria. The plaintiffs were a television 
news company based in London and broadcasting in Arabic 
(ANN), and its owner, the nephew of former Syrian president 
Hafez al-Assad.44 The defendants were the former editor in chief 
and the publisher of a daily newspaper written in Arabic and 
published in London.45 An opinion editorial in this newspaper 
stated, inter alia, that the first plaintiff, run by the second 
                                                                                                     
 40. Id. at 469. 
 41. Id. at 479; see also Sim v. Stretch, [1936] 2 All Eng. Rep. 1237 (H.L.) 
1240 (Eng.) (“[W]ould the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of 
right-thinking members of society generally?”). 
 42. PHILIP LEWIS, GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 23 (8th ed. 1981); see also 
Lidsky, supra note 6, at 16 (“British courts . . . [resort to] the general consensus 
of society . . . .”). 
 43. [2001] EWCA (Civ.) 118 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/ 
cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/118.html. 
 44. Id. at [2]. 
 45. Id. 
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plaintiff, “has taken up a line vis-à-vis peace negotiations [with 
Israel] different from the official Syrian line, to say the least;” 
additionally, “[the second plaintiff] has always spoken as an 
opposition” and “his television station in dealing with Egypt has 
sought writers and journalists known for being a minority in 
Egyptian political thinking, who call for truce negotiations with 
Israel, and make contacts with it” beyond the limits drawn by the 
Egyptian government.46 The editorial concluded with the need to 
protect the Arab cause from “American and Israeli schemes 
contrived together with weak people.”47 The plaintiffs brought an 
action for defamation, arguing that they were portrayed as 
“willing tools or agents” of Israel and the United States “in their 
schemes to undermine the pan-Arab cause.”48 ANN also argued 
that its political objectivity and neutrality had been challenged.49 
Alleging that a person or a news network supports peace 
negotiations between Israel and the Arab world could not be 
considered defamatory by the average Briton. The question, then, 
was whether a statement could be considered defamatory if it 
prejudiced the plaintiff “amongst part of society, such as the Arab 
or Arab-speaking community [in England], rather than amongst 
society generally.”50 Based on Tolley, the first instance responded 
in the negative.51 The Court of Appeal concluded that the 
reference to “American and Israeli schemes contrived together 
with weak people” did not allude to the plaintiffs, but to the 
second plaintiff’s father and his associates,52 and that while the 
editorial disapproved of ANN’s presentation of opposition views, 
it did not allege lack of impartiality.53 Thus, it was unnecessary 
to determine whether the defamatory nature of a statement 
should “be judged by the reaction of ordinary reasonable people in 
our society as a whole or by that of such people within a 
                                                                                                     
 46. Id. at [6]. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at [7]. 
 49. Id. at [7], [17]. 
 50. Id. at [14]. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at [21]–[23]. 
 53. Id. at [25]–[27]. 
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particular community within that society.”54 Nonetheless, the 
court opined in obiter that there are considerable difficulties in 
departing from the general community test, which had been 
endorsed in “a long series of powerful authorities.”55 Thus, Tolley 
is still in force in England, at least according to some.56 
The general community test is also manifested in other 
common law jurisdictions.57 For example, in the Australian case 
of Reader’s Digest Services Proprietary Ltd. v Lamb,58 the 
defendants published a book chapter implying that the plaintiff, 
the editor of The Sun, exploited a personal friend’s tragedy and 
trust to secure a sensational story in violation of journalistic 
ethical standards.59 Witnesses for the plaintiff addressed the 
possible impact of this incident on the plaintiff’s reputation 
among journalists.60 The High Court of Australia explained that 
in determining whether a statement is defamatory, the court 
relies on the standards by which hypothetical referees would 
evaluate the character of the imputation.61 These hypothetical 
referees “share a moral or social standard . . . [which is] common 
to society generally.”62 The court emphasized that the defamatory 
nature of a statement “is ascertained by reference to general 
community standards, not by reference to sectional attitudes.”63 
Moreover, it is for the jury to give effect “to a standard which they 
consider to accord with the attitude of society generally.”64 An 
                                                                                                     
 54. Id. at [30]. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., Thornton v. Tel. Media Grp. Ltd., [2010] EWHC (QB) 1414, 
[81], [2011] 1 W.L.R. 1985 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/ 
cases/EWHC/QB/2010/1414.html (stating that the Tolley definition does not 
encompass the threshold of seriousness required to assess a statement’s 
defamatory character). 
 57. See Burchell, supra note 11, at 178, 180, 182–83 (contending that the 
“right thinking people generally” test was adopted in South Africa). 
 58. (1982) 150 CLR 500 (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/ 
cases/cth/HCA/1982/4.html. 
 59. Id. at 502–03. 
 60. Id. at 504. 
 61. Id. at 506. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 507. 
 64. Id. at 506. However, while evidence of the attitude of particular groups 
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Australian commentator explained that in establishing which 
standards are “common to society generally,” one must “consider 
the prevailing values of a geographically determined population, 
taking that population as a whole”; in particular, one needs to 
look for a consensus, and if none exists, opt for the majority view 
or the average viewpoint, both representing the general 
community.65 Although this position has not been endorsed by all 
Australian courts,66 it is apparently favored by most Australian 
judges and lawyers.67 
A nineteenth-century Irish case also supports this position. 
In Mawe v. Pigott,68 the plaintiff, a parish priest, was attacked in 
the defendant’s newspaper for denouncing the “Fenian 
conspirators” (supporters of Irish independence), and was 
allegedly exposed to hatred and contempt by people who 
considered him an informer or an accomplice of the British 
prosecution.69 The court assumed that the plaintiff could be 
exposed to hatred among such people, but held that “[t]he very 
circumstances which will make a person be regarded with 
disfavour by the criminal classes will raise his character in the 
estimation of right-thinking men. We can only regard the 
estimation in which a man is held by society generally.”70 
Seemingly, this was a politically colored, over-inclusive 
application of the general community test. It is reasonable to 
assume that opposing the Irish independence movement could be 
seen in a negative light by the general Irish population at that 
time.71 
                                                                                                     
of classes is irrelevant and inadmissible for the purpose of determining whether 
a statement is defamatory, it is relevant for ascertaining harm once a 
defamatory statement is proven. Id. at 507–08. 
 65. Baker, supra note 20, at 7, 8, 10. 
 66. Infra notes 153–60 and accompanying text.  
 67. See ROY BAKER, DEFAMATION LAW AND SOCIAL ATTITUDES: ORDINARY 
UNREASONABLE PEOPLE 61 (2011) (explaining that Lamb lays down “the more 
influential” test); Baker, supra note 20, at 5, 8 (same). 
 68. [1869] 4 I.R. (Ir.). 
 69. Id. at 54–55. 
 70. Id. at 62. 
 71. See PATRICK STEWARD & BRYAN MCGOVERN, THE FENIANS: IRISH 
REBELLION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC WORLD, 1858–1876, at xvi (2013) (discussing 
the reasons why the Fenian movement was unable to garner enough support to 
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The general community test has been invoked on several 
occasions in American caselaw, but as we demonstrate below, it 
has not been the dominant test for at least a century.72 First, it 
can be found in relatively old cases. For example, the plaintiffs in 
Lyman v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co.,73 a husband 
and wife, brought an action against the defendant-publisher for 
libel after its newspaper printed a story implying that they were 
having marital difficulties which would naturally lead to divorce 
or legal separation.74 The court opined that the “standing in the 
community” of a successfully married couple is higher than that 
of a couple whose marriage had failed; this is the rule that 
“people in general” apply to the marriages of others.75 Thus, 
publishing that a husband and wife ceased to live together in 
harmony injured their reputation.76 The relevant position was 
that of the public at large. We can speculate, however, that given 
the prevailing views in the 1930s, applying a sectorial test in 
such a case would have generated the same outcome. 
Second, the general community test has been invoked in 
more recent cases to refute the assertion that a particular 
statement was defamatory per se without precluding 
determination that it was defamatory per quod. In Hayes v. 
Smith,77 the plaintiff, a high school teacher, alleged that the 
defendants told her supervisor, the superintendent, that she was 
a homosexual.78 In refusing to classify this statement as slander 
per se the court held that “there is no empirical evidence in this 
record demonstrating that homosexuals are held by society in 
such poor esteem. Indeed, it appears that the community view 
toward homosexuals is mixed.”79 Thus, the “plaintiff must prove 
                                                                                                     
establish Irish independence). 
 72. See infra text accompanying notes 73–83 (demonstrating that the 
general community test has been used in a supplemental role by courts, and has 
not been relied on as the determinative test). 
 73. 190 N.E. 542 (Mass. 1934). 
 74. Id. at 542. 
 75. Id. at 544. 
 76. Id. 
 77. 832 P.2d 1022 (Colo. App. 1991). 
 78. Id. at 1023. 
 79. Id. at 1025. 
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that the statements, in the context in which they were made, 
were defamatory [slanderous per quod] and that they in turn 
caused her injury.”80 In Stern v. Cosby,81 the court similarly held 
that imputing homosexuality was not defamatory per se.82 The 
court concluded that the “‘current of contemporary public opinion’ 
does not support the notion that New Yorkers view gays and 
lesbians as shameful or odious,” relying inter alia on opinion polls 
whereby a clear majority of New York residents supported same-
sex marriage, and an even greater majority supported civil 
unions.83 
Because the general community test is essentially an 
empirical one, it is sensitive to time and place. Public opinion 
may vary from time to time and across jurisdictions, even within 
a specific legal tradition.84 Thus, for example, while calling a man 
“Papist” was not deemed defamatory in England at the time of 
King James I,85 it was held defamatory during the reign of King 
Charles II, following the restoration of the Church of England as 
an exclusive national church.86 Likewise, while referring to an 
American citizen as a Loyalist shortly after the American 
Revolutionary War could be deemed defamatory in the United 
States, it was presumably not considered defamatory in England 
or in Canada. 
One criticism that can be leveled at the general community 
test is that even at a certain time and place, “[n]o conduct is 
hated by all.”87 As one commentator noted, “a community could 
never unanimously agree on the praiseworthiness or the 
                                                                                                     
 80. Id. at 1026. 
 81. 645 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 82. Id. at 275–76. 
 83. Id. at 274. 
 84. See Burchell, supra note 11, at 178 (“[T]he defamatory content of words 
may vary with the temper of times and in accordance with the prevailing social 
and moral views.”). 
 85. See Ireland v. Smith, (1611) 123 Eng. Rep. 633 (C.P.) 633 (“[F]or this 
word Papist no action will lie.”). 
 86. See Roe v. Clargis, (1684) 87 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B.) 15–17 (stating that 
calling someone in a public office a Papist is an actionable offense); Walden v. 
Mitchell, (1690) 86 Eng. Rep. 431 (K.B.) 431 (“To call a man a Papist . . . is not 
actionable unless spoken of a bishop.”). 
 87. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909). 
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blameworthiness of any description by which a man might be 
characterized.”88 A straightforward response might be that in 
applying a general community test, one need not seek consensus 
and may be satisfied with a majority or an average person, both 
representing the general community in some sense.89 However, 
this shift is exactly the one that our theoretical framework 
rejects. We will explain why these versions of the general 
community test are theoretically unsound in Part III.90 Moreover, 
relying on a majority opinion or on the average person to 
determine whether a statement is defamatory may be practical 
only in relatively homogenous societies, as England once was.91 It 
may take the sting out of defamation law in diverse, 
multicultural, or immigrant societies—such as that of the United 
States. Attributing a certain characteristic or conduct may not 
prejudice a person in the eyes of a majority of the general 
American population or an average American, but may defame 
him or her among members of a relevant segment of society.92 
2. The Qualitative Qualification 
The traditional English test, which relies on empirical 
observations, at least de jure, consists of a normative constraint. 
A statement is defamatory if considered so by the general 
                                                                                                     
 88. Note, With How Many People Must a Writing Have a Tendency to 
Disgrace the Plaintiff to Be Actionable, 58 U. PA. L. REV. 44, 46 (1909) 
[hereinafter Disgracing the Plaintiff]. 
 89. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (describing a majoritarian 
approach to the general community test in which the average person would be 
the standard for the community). 
 90. See infra Part III.A.1 (determining the empirical results from the 
general community test are negative and that this negativity outweighs the 
unanimity the general community test provides). 
 91. See David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair 
Comment II, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1282, 1300–01 (1942) (discussing homogeneity 
in England); Burchell, supra note 11, at 184 (explaining that the general 
community test fits England, where the population is relatively homogeneous). 
 92. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 8, 41, 43, 49 (comparing homogenous and 
heterogeneous societies, arguing that the homogenous community is a myth); 
Burchell, supra note 11, at 184 (arguing that heterogeneity in South Africa calls 
for replacing the general community test with a sectorial test). 
2286 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2269 (2013) 
community, taking into account the views of “right thinking” 
people. While it is possible to treat “right thinking” as 
synonymous with “ordinary” or “average,” adding no normative 
dimension to the empirical test,93 this is not the dominant 
interpretation of this term. “Right thinking” is considered the 
opposite of “wrong thinking,” that is, ethically constrained.94 Put 
differently, the fact that a person’s reputation may be injured in 
the eyes of the general community is important but inconclusive. 
The court will pay no heed to a community standard if it does not 
comply with the normative threshold. 
But how should this threshold be defined? On the one hand, 
the normative constraint must be a limited one because 
subjecting the empirical component to an all-pervasive and highly 
demanding ethical commitment might practically nullify the 
former. Consequently, it may leave real and substantial harm to 
one’s reputation without redress.95 On the other hand, excluding 
only the judgments of the depraved and the lunatic might take 
the sting out of the normative constraint. Thus, in practice, 
courts rarely override the community standard, and when they do 
so it is usually because the commonly held view seems clearly 
contrary to public policy.96 
Overriding an empirical conclusion on the basis of public 
policy seems more likely under the American sectorial test 
discussed below because it should be easier for a court to reject 
the views of eccentric minorities than to reject commonly held 
views. Yet one can imagine cases in which a court concludes that 
the general community standard is so morally unacceptable that 
it should be disregarded. Racial prejudice may serve as a good 
example. Whereas associating a person with a racial minority 
                                                                                                     
 93. This was apparently the case in South Africa in the 1970s. See 
Burchell, supra note 11, at 180, 182 (discussing the fact that in South Africa 
during the 1970s, right thinking was synonymous with average, or ordinary). 
 94. Id. at 180–81. 
 95. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 22–23, 39 (discussing the informant case 
and explaining that harm exists). 
 96. See infra notes 100–10 and accompanying text (describing cases in 
which the Georgia Court of Appeals ignored the community standards of racial 
segregation and white supremacy in favor of public policies supporting 
desegregation and racial homogeneity). 
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would not be deemed defamatory by the general community 
today, the social and political climate was quite different not long 
ago. In the early twentieth century, referring to a Caucasian 
individual as a “negro” was held defamatory in several 
jurisdictions. In May v. Shreveport Traction Co.,97 the plaintiff, a 
Caucasian woman, was classified as a “negro” by the streetcar 
conductor and sent to the seats reserved for “negro passengers.”98 
The plaintiff contended that she was humiliated, and the court 
concluded, relying on prevailing “social habits, customs, and 
prejudices,” that “to charge a white person, in this part of the 
world, with being a negro, is an insult, which must, of necessity, 
humiliate, and may materially injure, the person to whom the 
charge is applied.”99  
Later on, courts began to challenge the defamatory nature of 
statements concerning race. To the extent that this was done 
while racial segregation was still the social norm, the conceptual 
tool was reference to public policy.100 Consider Watkins v. 
Augusta Chronicle Publishing Co.,101 decided by the Court of 
Appeals of Georgia in 1934. The defendant’s newspaper published 
an article stating that the plaintiff, a candidate for the office of 
                                                                                                     
 97. 53 So. 671 (La. 1910). 
 98. Id. at 672, 674. 
 99. Id. at 674; see also Spotorno v. Fourichon, 4 So. 71, 71 (La. 1888) 
(“Under the social habits, customs, and prejudices prevailing in Louisiana, it 
cannot be disputed that charging a white man with being a negro is calculated 
to inflict injury and damage.”); Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. 637, 639 
(S.C. 1905) (“To call a white man a negro, affects the social status of the white 
man so referred to.”); Bowen v. Indep. Publ’g Co., 96 S.E.2d 564, 566 (S.C. 1957) 
(“[T]o publish in a newspaper of a white woman that she is a Negro . . . in view 
of the social habits and customs deep-rooted in this State, such publication is 
calculated to affect her standing in society and to injure her in the estimation of 
her friends and acquaintances.”); Haven Ward, “I’m Not Gay, M’Kay?”: Should 
Falsely Calling Someone a Homosexual Be Defamatory?, 44 GA. L. REV. 739, 
749–50 (2010) (“[I]t was defamatory as a matter of law to misidentify a white 
person as black.”). But see Williams v. Riddle, 140 S.W. 661, 664–65 (Ky. 1911) 
(finding that referring to a white person as a negro is not actionable per se, and 
that in the absence of a special damage caused by the statement there is no 
cause of action at all). 
 100. See Burchell, supra note 11, at 181 (stating that if prevailing views 
change, the community standard changes, and there is no need to resort to 
public policy to overcome racial perception). 
 101. 174 S.E. 199 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934). 
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sheriff of the municipal court of Augusta, was endorsed by the 
African-American community in the city.102 Allegedly, this was a 
death blow to his candidacy in a society that adhered to “white 
supremacy.”103 Still, the court was unwilling to find defamatory 
the statement that a candidate was endorsed by a particular 
racial group.104 It explained that “[n]o man is worthy of holding 
office in this or any other state who does not purpose in his heart 
to deal fairly and justly with all men, irrespective of race, color, or 
creed. All right thinking men covet the good will and esteem of all 
men.”105 In Thomason v. Times-Journal, Inc.,106 the plaintiff 
brought an action for defamation against a newspaper that 
published an obituary notice erroneously stating that she was 
deceased.107 Also, while the plaintiff was white, the obituary 
listed a funeral home primarily serving black people.108 The court 
relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Palmore v. Sidoti,109 
opining that while racial and ethnic prejudices still exist in 
practice, the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.110 
We emphasize that as common perceptions about race change, 
resorting to public policy is no longer necessary to preclude 
actions for defamation based on false imputation of race. 
In a similar manner, a court may decide that homophobes 
are not right-thinking persons for the purposes of defamation 
law, even if homophobia is a prevalent social norm, “on the basis 
that disparagement of homosexuals has no sound moral 
foundation.”111 In the past, courts commonly held that false 
                                                                                                     
 102. Id. at 200. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 201. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 379 S.E.2d 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). 
 107. Id. at 552. 
 108. Id. at 553. 
 109. 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
 110. Id. at 433; see also Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. 
Rptr. 252, 261–62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (relying on Palmore to the same effect); 
Burchell, supra note 11, at 181 (explaining that while calling a white person 
“Hottentot” was empirically defaming, the right-thinking person is free from 
racial prejudice and would not consider it defamatory). 
 111. Baker, supra note 20, at 12; see also Anthony Michael Kreis, Lawrence 
Meets Libel: Squaring Constitutional Norms with Sexual-Orientation 
 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DEFAMATION 2289 
imputation of homosexuality was defamatory per se. Many now 
reject this view on the basis of either actual changes in social 
attitudes or public policy, although they still allow actions for 
defamation per quod.112 Consider Yonaty v. Mincolla,113 in which 
the defendant, through a third-party defendant, told the 
plaintiff’s girlfriend that he was gay, thereby causing “the 
deterioration and ultimate termination of [their] relationship.”114 
While the court found that statements falsely imputing 
homosexuality were previously held defamatory per se based on 
community standards,115 it opined that these decisions were 
inconsistent with current public policy.116 The prior cases hinged 
on the flawed premise that it was shameful and disgraceful to be 
described as gay.117 Yet, “[g]iven this state’s well-defined public 
                                                                                                     
Defamation, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 125, 138–40 (2012), www.yale 
lawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1112.pdf (arguing that such claims must be denied); 
Ward, supra note 99, at 742 (“Courts should not give effect to homophobia by 
holding such statements defamatory because it sanctions and endorses 
homophobic views.”); id. at 743 (“In the case of misidentification of someone as 
homosexual, public policy considerations outweigh the potential harm to the 
plaintiff of not allowing recovery because courts should not sanction or endorse 
homophobia.”); id. at 760–65 (positing that allowing claims validates and 
legitimizes homophobic views and contravenes public policy against 
discrimination, despite empirical support). 
 112. See Ward, supra note 99, at 752–58 (discussing the fact that courts are 
split as to whether falsely labeling someone as homosexual is defamatory per se 
or per quod, but that courts are united in the belief that calling someone 
homosexual is defamatory); see also Abigail A. Rury, Note, He’s So Gay . . . Not 
That There’s Anything Wrong with That: Using a Community Standard to 
Homogenize the Measure of Reputational Damage in Homosexual Defamation 
Cases, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 655, 656–57 (2011) (discussing the fact that 
courts have shifted from holding that the false identification of someone as 
homosexual is per se defamation to holding that such identification is at most 
per quod defamation). 
 113. 945 N.Y.S.2d 774 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). 
 114. Id. at 776. 
 115. See, e.g., Gallo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-Societa per Azioni, 585 
F. Supp. 2d 520, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[H]omophobia is sufficiently widespread 
and deeply held that an imputation of homosexuality can—at least when 
directed to a man married to a woman—be deemed every bit as offensive as 
imputing unchastity to a woman.” (footnote omitted)). 
 116. See Yonaty, 945 N.Y.S.2d at 777 (“[T]hese Appellate Division decisions 
are inconsistent with current public policy and should no longer be followed.”). 
 117. See id. (“[T]he prior cases categorizing statements that falsely impute 
homosexuality as defamatory per se are based upon the flawed premise that it is 
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policy of protection and respect for the civil rights of people who 
are lesbian, gay or bisexual, we now overrule our prior case to the 
contrary and hold that such statements are not defamatory per 
se.”118 In other words, public policy may trump the public 
perception. The court added, however, that there has been a 
“tremendous evolution in social attitudes regarding 
homosexuality”119 and a corresponding legal change; thus, “it 
cannot be said that current public opinion supports a rule that 
would equate statements imputing homosexuality with 
accusations of serious criminal conduct or insinuations that an 
individual has a loathsome disease.”120 Here too, as common 
perceptions change, resort to public policy is no longer necessary 
to make attribution of homosexuality nondefamatory. 
B. Substantial and Respectable Minority 
1. The Principle 
In the early twentieth century, American courts deviated 
from the traditional English test.121 In Peck v. Tribune Co.,122 the 
defendant newspaper published an advertisement in which the 
plaintiff’s picture was presented as that of Mrs. Schuman, a 
nurse recommending a certain brand of whiskey for its health-
enhancing properties.123 Alas, the plaintiff was not Mrs. 
                                                                                                     
shameful and disgraceful to be described as lesbian, gay or bisexual.”). 
 118. Id. at 776. 
119  Id. at 778. 
 120. Id. at 779. 
 121. See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the traditional English test as a 
general community test).  
 122. 214 U.S. 185 (1909). 
 123. See id. at 188 
The Chicago Sunday Tribune, and, so far as is material, is as follows: 
“Nurse and Patients Praise Duffy’s. Mrs. A. Schuman, One of 
Chicago’s Most Capable and Experienced Nurses, Pays an Eloquent 
Tribute to the Great Invigorating, Life-Giving, and Curative 
Properties of Duffy’s Pure Malt Whisky.” Then followed a portrait of 
the plaintiff, with the words, “Mrs. A. Schuman,” under it. Then, in 
quotation marks, “After years of constant use of your Pure Malt 
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Schuman, was not a nurse, and abstained from distilled alcoholic 
beverages.124 Assuming that the advertisement could be perceived 
as attributing the recommendation to the plaintiff, the question 
was whether such publication was defamatory.125 The Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that it was not because there was no 
“general consensus of opinion” that drinking whiskey was wrong 
or that being a nurse was discreditable, and because participating 
in advertising might be ridiculed by only a few.126 In overruling 
this decision, Justice Holmes opined that “[i]f the advertisement 
obviously would hurt the plaintiff in the estimation of an 
important and respectable part of the community, liability is not 
a question of a majority vote.”127 A statement can constitute 
defamation if it is “known by a large number, and . . . lead[s] an 
appreciable fraction of that number to regard the plaintiff with 
contempt.”128 Justice Holmes added that a doctor represented in 
advertising might have a cause of action if the representation 
affects his or her reputation among doctors, even if the public at 
large does not consider it detrimental.129 In other words, there is 
no need for a consensus or even a majority opinion to establish 
defamation. The test is that of a “considerable and respectable 
                                                                                                     
Whisky, both by myself and as given to patients in my capacity as 
nurse, I have no hesitation in recommending it as the very best tonic 
and stimulant for all local and run-down conditions,” etc., etc., with 
the words, “Mrs. A. Schuman, 1576 Mozart St., Chicago, Ill.,” at the 
end, not in quotation marks, but conveying the notion of a signature, 
or at least that the words were hers. 
 124. See id. (“The declaration alleged that the plaintiff was not Mrs. 
Schuman, was not a nurse, and was a total abstainer from whisky and all 
spirituous liquors.”).  
 125. See id. at 189 (“The question, then, is whether the publication was a 
libel.”). 
 126. See id. (“[T]here was no general consensus of opinion that to drink 
whisky is wrong, or that to be a nurse is discreditable . . . . [A] certificate and 
the use of one’s portrait in aid of an advertisement would be regarded with 
irony, or a stronger feeling, only by a few.”). 
 127. Id. at 190. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. (“Thus, if a doctor were represented as advertising, the fact that 
it would affect his standing with other of his profession might make the 
representation actionable, although advertising is not reputed dishonest, and 
even seems to be regarded by many with pride.” (citations omitted)). 
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class in the community.”130 The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
endorsed this position, reiterating that there is no need for a 
consensus or a majority opinion and that a statement is 
defamatory if it might prejudice the person “in the eyes of a 
substantial and respectable minority.”131 
A substantial and respectable minority can be defined in two 
primary ways—in sociological terms, as a class or a sector, or in 
numerical terms, as a portion of the general public. Thus, for 
example, in Peck v. Tribune Co., a sociological definition could 
have been people of the plaintiff’s congregation, and a numerical 
definition could have been ten percent of the population of 
Illinois. We will now demonstrate that the sociological–sectorial 
test is the dominant one in American caselaw. Religious 
denominations, professional circles, and distinct cultural 
communities are often used as reference points. 
An example for the application of the sectorial test to a 
particular religious faith is Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp,132 which 
opened this Article.133 The plaintiff-respondent, a Jewish woman, 
contended that the defendant-petitioner published a report 
falsely implying that she became “a believer in the tenets, the 
actions, and the philosophy of Jews for Jesus.”134 She argued, 
inter alia, that the publication constituted defamation.135 The 
                                                                                                     
 130. Id.; see also Marcoux-Norton v. Kmart Corp., 907 F. Supp. 766, 778 (D. 
Vt. 1993)  
A communication is defamatory “if it tends so to harm the reputation 
of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to 
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him” . . . . For the 
purposes of this definition, the community may be a substantial 
respectable group, even though only a minority of the total 
community.  
(citations omitted). 
 131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977) (“A 
communication to be defamatory need not tend to prejudice the other in the eyes 
of everyone in the community or of all of his associates, nor even in the eyes of a 
majority.”). 
 132. 997 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2008). 
 133. Supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.  
 134. Jews for Jesus, 997 So. 2d at 1100–01 (citation omitted). 
 135. See id. at 1101 (“Rapp’s complaint alleged: (1) false light invasion of 
privacy; (2) defamation; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress.”). 
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trial court dismissed her complaint.136 The District Court of 
Appeal of Florida affirmed, finding that “the ‘common mind’ 
reading the newsletter would not have found [the plaintiff] to be 
an object of ‘hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt or disgrace.’”137 
The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the District Court of 
Appeal’s decision, holding that “a communication can be 
considered defamatory if it ‘prejudices’ the plaintiff in the eyes of 
a ‘substantial and respectable minority of the community.’”138 The 
statement need not be construed as defamatory “by the 
community at large.”139 It may be reasonably assumed that the 
court contemplated the possible impact of attributing a belief in 
Jesus to a member of the Jewish community, given that such 
attribution could not prejudice the plaintiff in the eyes of the 
Christian majority. 
An example for the application of the sectorial test to a 
particular profession is Sharratt v. Housing Innovations, Inc.140 
The plaintiff-architect entered into a contract to design a housing 
project for the defendant-developer.141 Alas, the defendant named 
another partnership as the project architects in its promotional 
brochure, contrary to the plaintiff’s representations to his 
business associates.142 The architect and his architecture firm 
“alleged damage to their professional reputation among the real 
estate development and architectural community in which they 
work[ed].”143 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
explained that the characterization of a statement as defamatory 
is a question of fact, not of law.144 It held that to be actionable, a 
                                                                                                     
 136. See id. (“The trial court dismissed [Rapp’s] final complaint in its 
entirety with prejudice.”). 
 137. Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 944 So. 2d 460, 464 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2006). 
 138. Jews for Jesus Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1100, 1114–15 (Fla. 2008). 
 139. Id. at 1115. 
 140. 310 N.E.2d 343 (Mass. 1974). 
 141. See id. at 344 (“In 1972 the corporate plaintiff entered into a contract 
with a development corporation to design, as the architect, a project known as 
‘Madison Park Houses.’”). 
 142. Id. at 344–45. 
 143. Id. at 346. 
 144. See id. at 345 (“It is now well settled that the character of a publication 
as being [libelous] or otherwise is not to be judged by what we ourselves would 
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statement “need not hold a plaintiff up to ridicule or damage his 
reputation in the community at large, or among all reasonable 
men. It is enough that they do so among ‘a considerable and 
respectable class’ of people.”145 In particular, a statement clearly 
deemed defamatory among the professional community to which 
the plaintiff belongs should not fail to be actionable merely 
because it is not considered so by “the general public.”146 
An interesting example for the application of the sectorial 
test to a distinct cultural community is Reiman v. Pacific 
Development Society.147 A local newspaper in the Finnish 
language published an article accusing the plaintiff, a member of 
the Finnish community in Oregon, of trying to disrupt labor 
organizations to the advantage of capitalists.148 The court found 
for the plaintiff,149 even though this publication could affect his 
reputation only within the Finnish community.150 This decision is 
used by the Restatement (Second) of Torts as an illustration for 
an application of the sectorial test.151 
The sectorial test has been endorsed by jurists in other 
common law jurisdictions. For example, both Peck and the 
Restatement are cited with approval in a well-known Canadian 
tort law treatise,152 admittedly without any independent 
Canadian support. The sectorial test was also adopted by the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal in Hepburn v. TCN Channel 
Nine Pty. Ltd.153 The question arose in regard to whether it was 
defamatory to accuse a medical practitioner of conducting lawful 
abortions.154 Justice Glass held, first, that the test must be of an 
                                                                                                     
understand it to mean, but that commonly the question is one of fact . . . .” 
(quoting King v. Ne. Publ’g Co., 2 N.E. 486, 486–87 (Mass. 1936))). 
 145. Id. at 346 (citations omitted). 
 146. Id. 
 147. 284 P. 575 (Or. 1930). 
 148. Id. at 578. 
 149. Id. at 579. 
 150. Id. at 576. 
 151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977) (discussing 
cases that illustrate comment e and listing Reiman as an illustrative case). 
 152. ALLEN M. LINDEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW 688 nn.49–50 (7th ed. 2001). 
 153. [1983] 2 NSWLR 682 (Austl.). 
 154. See id. at 693 (“Much of the argument on appeal was devoted to 
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empirical nature.155 After contrasting the English and 
American positions,156 he opined that “a man can justly 
complain that words, which lower him in the estimation of an 
appreciable and reputable section of the community, were 
published to members of it, even though those same words 
might exalt him to the level of a hero in other quarters.”157 
Thus, Justice Glass adopted the American approach.158 
Interestingly, this seems like a numerical version of the 
sectorial test, as the judge does not refer to the views of a 
specific sector, but rather refers to those of a certain portion of 
the general population that does not constitute a majority. It is 
unclear whether the Australian High Court’s decision in 
Reader’s Digest overrides the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Hepburn.159 Some commentators prefer 
                                                                                                     
imputation (c) viz that the plaintiff was an abortionist.”). 
 155. See id. at 693–94 (“[R]egard should be paid to actual community 
standards, right or wrong.”). 
 156. See id. at 693  
There is a body of English authority which suggests that the standard 
of opinion is that of “right thinking people generally” . . . . In the 
United States, on the other hand, an imputation can be defamatory if 
it injures a man in the eyes of a “considerable and respectable class in 
the community” though it be only a minority.  
(citations omitted). 
 157. Id. at 694. 
 158. See BAKER, supra note 67, at 60 (“[A]ccording to Hepburn the test is 
whether it might lead to damage to reputation among an ‘appreciable’ or, 
according to Hutley JA, ‘substantial’ section of the community, which 
presumably can include a minority. Cleary Hepburn is presenting a sectionalist 
test.”); LAWRENCE MCNAMARA, REPUTATION AND DEFAMATION 121 (2007) (“The 
court effectively adopted the American approach.”); Baker, supra note 20, at 7–8 
(“Now the question is not what most people think, but what do some people 
think? . . . [U]nder Hepburn the community of ‘ordinary reasonable people’ is 
less homogenous in its responses to the imputation, with large proportions of its 
members holding diametrically opposed views.”). 
 159. See BAKER, supra note 67, at 60–61 
In terms of hierarchy of precedent, Reader’s Digest was a decision of 
the High Court of Australia, while Hepburn was determined by the 
Court of Appeal of New South Wales. A decision of a higher court 
should override a contrary dictum from a lower. On the other hand, 
the dictum quoted from Reader’s Digest could be regarded as obiter on 
this issue . . . . On that basis, Reader’s Digest would, as an authority, 
be persuasive at best, and would not bind future courts.  
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Hepburn, explaining that it better fits the cultural diversity in 
Australia.160 
We should note here that despite the empirical pretense, 
American courts rarely use or seek empirical data concerning 
actual views and perceptions.161 They sometimes do,162 but in 
practice, many decisions hinge on an intuitive judgment, that 
is, “common knowledge” and common sense regarding the 
relevant community’s values.163 Some scholars encourage 
greater reliance on concrete evidence of actual perceptions of 
the relevant sector, such as polls and surveys.164 
2. The Quantitative Qualification 
Although the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that 
a statement can be defamatory if it prejudices a person in the 
                                                                                                     
(footnote omitted). 
 160. See MCNAMARA, supra note 158, at 122 (“The decision in Hepburn was 
appropriate . . . . The general standard of Readers’ Digest v. Lamb should be 
reconsidered by Australian courts, especially given the cultural diversity that 
characterizes Australian society and many local communities.”). 
 161. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 18 (“[I]t is important to note that courts 
rarely resort to polls or surveys to ascertain the attitudes of the ‘respectable 
part’ of the community.” (footnote omitted)). 
 162. See, e.g., Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(“[A]ccording to a recent opinion poll from Quinnipiac University—New York 
State residents support gay marriage 51 to 41 percent, with 8 percent 
undecided.” (citation omitted)). 
 163. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 18–19 (“The determination of who 
constitutes a substantial and respectable minority often hinges on what the 
judge presumes the community’s values are.”). 
 164. See id. at 47 (“[R]equiring . . . poll and survey results would add 
another layer of complexity to the already tangled web of defamation law. 
Nonetheless, the benefits of such a proposal in making defamation an effective 
instrument for redressing harm to reputation probably justify imposing this 
additional burden.” (footnote omitted)); Riesman, supra note 91, at 1307–08 
(“The use of these public opinion techniques would tend to avoid the subjective 
factors in the experience of the actual plaintiff, or of the court and jury.”); Rury, 
supra note 112, at 680 (“[T]he courts should articulate their findings by citing 
trends in legislation, public polls, or rely on expert testimony. Requiring the 
courts to identify the relevant community removes any implicit or explicit 
biases, and provides an articulable basis on which future courts may rely.”). 
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eyes of a minority,165 that minority must be substantial.166 
According to the Restatement, a single individual or a very small 
group of persons with peculiar views will not suffice.167 The 
courts’ thorny task, therefore, is to ascertain a very elusive border 
line.168 We are told that a single individual cannot constitute a 
substantial minority, but it is unclear when a group becomes 
sufficiently large for purposes of the sectorial test, a problem 
reminiscent of the sorites paradox.169 If a group of n members is 
sufficiently large, then a group of n-1 members cannot be 
insufficiently large because a single person does not make a real 
difference. But if this holds, then a group of n-2 members should 
also be sufficiently large, and so should a group of n-3 members, 
and so on and so forth. Ultimately, we get to the conclusion that a 
group of one member is also sufficiently large, contradicting our 
initial assumption. Setting the boundary is inherently arbitrary, 
but legally inevitable. 
For example, we have seen that jeopardizing a person’s 
reputation among American Jews might be deemed 
defamatory.170 The Jewish population is a sufficiently large 
                                                                                                     
 165. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977) (“A 
communication to be defamatory need not tend to prejudice the other in the eyes 
of everyone in the community or of all of his associates, not even in the eyes of a 
majority of them.”). 
 166. See id. (“It is enough that the communication would tend to prejudice 
him in the eyes of a substantial and respectable minority of them . . . .”). 
 167. See id. (“On the other hand, it is not enough that the communication 
would be derogatory in the view of a single individual or a very small group of 
persons, if the group is not large enough to constitute a substantial minority.”); 
accord WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 577 (2d ed. 1955) 
(“But if the group who will think the worse of the plaintiff is so small as to be 
negligible, or one whose standards are so clearly anti-social that the court may 
not properly consider them, no defamation will be found.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 168. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting that courts have 
struggled to decide what part of the community is the standard for determining 
defamation). 
 169. See Dominic Hyde, Sorites Paradox, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY 1, 1 (Edward Nalta ed., 2011), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
entries/sorites-paradox/ (“The sorites paradox is the name given to a class of 
paradoxical arguments, also known as little-by-little arguments, which arise as 
a result of the indeterminacy surrounding limits of application of the predicates 
involved.”). 
 170. See supra notes 134–39 and accompanying text (describing the facts, 
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minority for purposes of the sectorial test.171 Yet, within the 
Jewish population one might observe highly varied nuances.172 
Although a statement may in fact defame a person within a small 
fragment of a given minority, it will not be deemed defamatory 
from a legal standpoint.173 The case of Weiner v. Time & Life 
Inc.174 is illustrative, even if one may contest the outcome. A Time 
magazine article on anti-Semitic incidents near Yeshiva 
University in upper Manhattan ascribed the following quotation 
to the plaintiff, an orthodox Jewish rabbi: “I no longer wear my 
yarmulke [skullcap] when I’m out driving. Now I look over my 
shoulder to see who’s following me.”175 The plaintiff argued that 
he had never made this statement, and that its publication 
damaged his reputation as an observant Jew in his highly 
orthodox Jewish community.176  
                                                                                                     
procedural history, and holding in the Jews for Jesus case). 
 171. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 
tbl. 77 (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/ tables/12s0077.pdf 
(showing that over 6.5 million Jews made up 2.1% of the U.S. population in 
2010). 
 172. See Jonathon Ament, American Jewish Religious Denominations, 
UNITED JEWISH COMMUNITIES REPORT ON THE NATIONAL JEWISH POPULATION 
SURVEY 2000–01, Feb. 2005, at 8, http://www.jewishfederations.org/local_ 
includes/downloads/7579.pdf 
[T]he denominational choices of American Jews reveal an extremely 
diverse population. While most Jews still identify with a particular 
denomination, an increasing proportion of Jews appear to be opting 
out of a denominational framework, choosing instead to call 
themselves “just Jewish” or some variant of secular. No single 
category, denominational or not, garners the support of even 40% of 
all Jews. 
 173. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (identifying an individual or 
a very small group of individuals as insufficient according to the Restatement). 
 174. 507 N.Y.S.2d 784 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986). 
 175. Id. at 784. 
 176. See id. at 784–85 
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges the extrinsic facts that he is an Orthodox 
Jew and a Rabbi and that he never told the Time reporter that he 
removed his yarmulke, since to do so totally conflicts with plaintiff’s 
religious beliefs and observances and that the statement attributed to 
him that he removed his yarmulke when driving damaged his 
reputation by causing his neighbors, friends, religious associates and 
acquaintances to suspect and believe that he is a person of immoral 
and reprehensible character guilty of violating Orthodox Jewish Law. 
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The court opined that a publication is actionable if it “tends 
to expose a person to hatred, contempt or aversion . . . in the 
minds of a substantial number of the community”177 or “tends to 
make him be shunned or avoided, or deprived of the friendly 
association of a considerable number of respectable members of 
the community although it imputes no moral turpitude to him.”178 
The court then held that considering the small highly orthodox 
Jewish community in upper Manhattan to be the relevant 
community would be an overly restrictive view.179 In the court’s 
opinion, it would be unfair and unworkable to expect a national 
magazine with a heterogeneous audience to consider “each small 
enclave within various communities whenever it writes about a 
person.”180 A statement is not defamatory if deemed so only by 
those with “eccentric perceptions or preconceptions.”181 The court 
further explained that “[a] publication designed to reach a 
national audience cannot be judged by the standards of a unique 
and fractional segment of its total readership . . . . [T]he impact of 
an alleged libel cannot fairly be judged if we attempt to slice the 
community pie too thin.”182 Presumably, if the views of a larger 
and less eccentric segment were at stake, as in the case of Rapp, 
the court could find them relevant. Critics may argue that the 
highly orthodox Jewish population in New York is sufficiently 
large for purposes of the sectorial test,183 but this position only 
challenges the specific outcome and not the quantitative 
qualification. 
                                                                                                     
 177. Id. at 785 (quoting Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 100 (1947)). 
 178. Id. (quoting Brown v. Du Frey, 1 N.Y.2d 190, 196 (1956)). 
 179. See id. (“Plaintiff seeks to equate the word ‘community’ as tantamount 
to the small, highly Orthodox Jewish community in upper Manhattan with 
which he associates. This is too restrictive . . . .”).  
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See Joseph Berger, Aided by Orthodox, City’s Jewish Population Is 
Growing Again, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/ 
12/nyregion/new-yorks-jewish-population-is-growing-again.html?_r=0 (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2013) (stating that “the Jewish population of New York City is 
growing again, increasing to nearly 1.1 million”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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A somewhat more esoteric example is Fairley v. Peekskill 
Star Corp.,184 in which an article published in the defendant’s 
newspaper stated that the plaintiff, a self-proclaimed social 
theoretician, planner, and developer, described himself as a social 
scientist.185 Although we are still uncertain as to which people 
might consider this inaccuracy defamatory, the group is 
presumably small and eccentric.186 Thus, the court held that 
“[a]mong certain segments of the population a social scientist 
designation might be considered unflattering. [But] the 
peculiarities of taste found in eccentric groups cannot form a 
basis for a finding of libelous inferences.”187 
The quantitative qualification has three intuitive 
explanations. First, as the court in Weiner observed, reputational 
harm among members of a very small group may not be 
reasonably foreseeable by the publisher.188 Avoiding such harm 
might impose an excessive burden, mostly in the form of high 
information costs, on publishers.189 Second, the size requirement 
ensures that “the injury to reputation is not de minimis.”190 A de 
minimis qualification generally aims to prevent a legal process 
where the administrative costs outweigh the benefits (in terms of 
deterrence or even justice).191 The problem with this explanation 
                                                                                                     
 184. 445 N.Y.S.2d 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). 
 185. Id. at 157–58. 
 186. See id. at 158 (noting that while certain segments of the population 
may consider the term to be defamatory, the opinion of these “eccentric” groups 
cannot form a basis for defamation). But see Lidsky, supra note 6, at 22 
(recognizing that a large percentage of the population feels contempt for 
informers, as indicated by substantial evidence) (citing John Irwin & Donald R. 
Cressey, Thieves, Convicts and the Inmate Culture, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
SUBCULTURES 64, 67 (David O. Arnold ed., 1970)).   
 187. Fairley, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 158. 
 188. See Weiner v. Time & Life, Inc., 507 N.Y.S.2d 784, 785 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1986) (noting that it would be “manifestly unfair and unworkable” for every 
publisher to consider every possible community when writing an article). 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 19 (“[T]he quantitative requirement of a 
‘substantial’ minority appears to be an attempt to ensure that the injury to 
reputation is not de minimis.” (citing Daniel More, Informers Defamation and 
Public Policy, 19 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 503, 517 (1989))). 
 191. See id. (explaining that the “substantial minority” size requirement 
attempts to “ensure that the defamatoriness inquiry does not devolve into a 
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is that if a single individual or a very small group of people who 
find the statement defamatory are the plaintiff’s close relatives or 
employer, the plaintiff will receive no recovery despite the 
substantial nature of his injury. What matters to the plaintiff is 
not the number of people who may think less of him, but rather 
the magnitude of the statement’s effect on each of them.192 Third, 
the quantitative qualification may prevent a proliferation of 
actions, many of which are frivolous.193 This is exceptionally 
important in the context of defamation because many lawsuits 
mean a greater encroachment on freedom of expression.194 
3. The Qualitative Qualification 
As explained above, both the English and the American 
empirical tests consist of a normative constraint.195 In England, a 
statement is defamatory if considered so by the general 
community, taking into account the views of “right-thinking” 
people.196 In the United States, a statement may be defamatory if 
considered so by a mere minority, provided that it is a 
“respectable” one.197 While the two concepts—“right-thinking” 
                                                                                                     
search for the few idiosyncratic individuals who would think less of the plaintiff 
for conduct that the overwhelming majority would find laudatory”). 
 192. Id. at 19–20 (discussing the significance of an individual’s reputation 
among small groups in society); see also id. at 42 (same). 
 193. See Burchell, supra note 11, at 186 (arguing that requiring the injury to 
reputation to be noticed among a “substantial and respectable” portion of the 
community prevents “a proliferation of defamation actions” in certain situations, 
such as when the feelings of a single family unit have been offended). 
 194. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (concluding 
that attacking publishers restricts the freedoms of speech and press and leads to 
intolerable levels of self-censorship); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
279–80 (1964) (opining that forcing critics of official conduct to guarantee the 
accuracy of their factual assertions leads to self-censorship). 
 195. See supra Part II.A.2 (describing the normative constraint of the 
English test); supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text (noting that American 
judges rarely use empirical data and often use intuition and common sense to 
determine the values of the community). 
 196. See Burchell, supra note 11, at 180 (discussing the creation of the 
“right-thinking” test); supra Part II.A (explaining the general community test in 
detail). 
 197. See, e.g., Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909) (finding that the 
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and “respectable”—do not necessarily have an identical 
meaning,198 they serve a similar purpose: normative screening. 
The fact that a person’s reputation may be injured in the eyes of a 
substantial minority is inconclusive.199 The court will reject the 
sectorial standard if it does not comply with the normative 
threshold.200 An American commentator summarized the 
applicable principle as follows: “Where the group under 
consideration approves of illegal or antisocial acts, or the 
nonfeasance of judicially approved acts, the courts have refused 
to recognize as legally damaging the factual injury caused by the 
false utterance.”201 In rejecting the sectorial test for public policy 
reasons, the court practically reverts to general community 
standards, and sets the limits of variance, diversity, and 
tolerance within the community.202 Critics say that this 
qualification leaves real reputational harm without redress, and 
without changing the deviant minority’s perceptions.203 
                                                                                                     
publication was defamatory because it hurt the plaintiff’s reputation within an 
important and respectable section of the community); Lidsky, supra note 6, at 
29 (discussing the value of a community’s reputation when an individual within 
the community attempts to proceed on libel charges). But see Kimmerle v. N.Y. 
Evening Journal, Inc., 186 N.E. 217, 218 (N.Y. 1933) (explaining that 
“widespread notoriety” is insufficient and that the statement must tend to affect 
the plaintiff’s reputation “in the minds of right-thinking persons”). 
 198. See Herrmann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 140 A.2d 529, 531 (N.J. 
1958) (“[U]nder the prevailing American rule, the court is not concerned . . . 
with whether the segment of the public which thinks odiously of plaintiff 
because of the facts stated in the publication is ‘right-thinking’ . . . . It is 
sufficient that it be ‘substantial’ and ‘respectable.’”). 
 199. A similar discussion has surrounded the English test. See supra Part 
II.A.2 (“[T]he fact that a person’s reputation may be injured in the eyes of the 
general community is important, but inconclusive. The court will pay no heed to 
a community standard if it does not comply with the normative threshold.”). 
 200. Supra Part II.A.2. 
 201. Note, The Community Segment in Defamation Actions: A Dissenting 
Essay, 58 YALE L.J. 1387, 1391 (1949). 
 202. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 40 (“[B]y defining the values of a particular 
group within the community as too antisocial to be recognized, [courts] are 
‘declaring how much variability and diversity can be tolerated within the 
group.’” (quoting KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY 
OF DEVIANCE 11 (1966))). 
 203. See id. at 39 (discussing the role of the court to provide redress for the 
victim’s injury and to redefine the values and prejudices of the community). 
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A recurring example is the informant case, which may be 
generalized as the assistance-to-law-enforcement case. In 
Connelly v. McKay,204 a truck service station owner was accused 
by the defendant of informing the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) about truck drivers who had violated ICC 
rules and regulations.205 He argued that this had affected his 
reputation among truck drivers and had harmed his business.206 
The court concluded that while accusing a person of being an 
informer might affect a person’s reputation among law violators, 
it cannot be deemed defamatory.207 The court cited the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, whereby “[t]he fact that a 
communication tends to prejudice another in the eyes of even a 
substantial group is not enough if the group is one whose 
standards are so antisocial that it is not proper for the courts to 
recognize them.”208 The legal system cannot consider cooperation 
with law enforcement agencies as negative conduct, even if 
people in some circles evidently consider it so.209 Thus, 
attributing such conduct to a person cannot underlie an action 
for defamation.210  
Connelly was followed in many subsequent cases.211 For 
instance, in Saunders v. Board of Directors, WHYY-TV (Channel 
12),212 the plaintiff-inmate was falsely presented in the 
defendant’s broadcast as an FBI informant.213 Relying on 
                                                                                                     
 204. 28 N.Y.S.2d 327 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941). 
 205. Id. at 328. 
 206. Id. at 328–29. 
 207. See id. at 329 (finding that informers may not be held in “high esteem” 
but the label does not constitute defamation). 
 208. Id. at 329 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e 
(1977)). 
 209. See id. (noting that to hold in favor of an antisocial group would 
“penalize the law-abiding citizen and give comfort to the law violator”). 
 210. See id. at 329–30 (concluding that words not creating a generally 
unflattering or immoral image fail to satisfy a defamation claim (citing Hallock 
v. Miller, 2 Barb. 630, 632 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1848))). 
 211. See, e.g., Rose v. Borenstein, 119 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289–90 (N.Y. City Ct. 
1953) (finding Connelly to be “a case precisely in point” and supportive of the 
decision that accusations of informing on others fails to qualify as defamation). 
 212. 382 A.2d 257 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978). 
 213. Id. at 258. 
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Connelly, the court found that the statement was not 
defamatory.214 It emphasized that while the allegation that an 
inmate is an informer might impair his reputation among fellow 
inmates, the tort of defamation is not designed to protect one’s 
reputation among members of a limited community whose views 
“depart substantially from those prevailing generally.”215 This 
formulation is somewhat different from that of Connelly, insofar 
as it does not focus on the antisocial nature of the standard, but 
instead on the magnitude of the deviation from the views of the 
general public. Theoretically, very eccentric but harmless views 
might be disregarded under Saunders, but not under Connelly. 
Although the public policy constraint is needed to exclude 
liability in the informer’s case under the American test, given the 
attitude toward informers among offenders, it may be redundant 
under the English test for an almost obvious reason: helping law 
enforcement agencies might be seen in a negative light in some 
circles, but not by the law-abiding public at large.216 Therefore, 
attributing such help may be considered defamatory under an 
empirical sectorial test, but not under a general community test. 
Indeed, English courts have treated cases of this kind somewhat 
differently. In Byrne v. Deane,217 the plaintiff was publicly 
identified as the person who informed the police of the presence of 
illegal gambling machines at a golf club, thereby denying fellow 
members the ability to gamble.218 The Court of Appeal denied his 
claim for defamation.219 Lord Justice Slesser opined that “to 
allege of a man . . . that he has reported certain acts, wrongful in 
law, to the police, cannot possibly be said to be defamatory of him 
in the minds of the general public.”220 The test is that of the 
                                                                                                     
 214. Id. at 259. 
 215. See id. (noting that the tort of defamation will not protect the 
reputations of those individuals whose attitudes and social values depart 
substantially from the values of the greater community). 
 216. But see Lidsky, supra note 6, at 22 (recognizing that a large portion of 
the general population feels contempt for informers (citing John Irwin & Donald 
R. Cressy, Thieves, Convicts and the Inmate Culture, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
SUBCULTURES 64, 67 (David O. Arnold ed., 1970))). 
 217. [1937] 1 K.B. 818 (C.A.) (Eng.). 
 218. Id. at 818. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 832–33. 
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“ordinary good and worthy subject of the King,” and such a 
subject would not consider the allegation that a certain person 
helped law enforcement against wrongdoers to be defamatory.221 
We nonetheless need to qualify this analysis, as some empirical 
evidence shows that a significant portion of the general 
population also despises informers.222 Thus, even the general 
community test may be ultimately imbued with normative 
content when applied to informant cases. 
C. The Purely Normative Test 
The defamatory nature of a particular statement is generally 
determined by an empirical test, be it a general community 
standard or a sectorial standard.223 While the two are qualified to 
some extent by a normative constraint, the essence of the inquiry 
remains mostly empirical. However, the defamatory nature of 
statements can also be tested from a purely normative 
perspective. Put differently, courts can determine that a 
particular statement is defamatory because it violates a 
normative ethical principle applicable to human interaction, 
regardless of the potential impact of the statement on the 
subject’s reputation.224 In so doing, courts will aim to prevent 
morally unacceptable publications, thereby imposing their own 
moral preferences on human communications.225 Again, purely 
                                                                                                     
 221. Id. The same conclusion was reached in South Africa. See Burchell, 
supra note 11, at 182, 195 (discussing a case where in which a student was 
allegedly helping the police to obtain evidence against fellow students at the 
university). 
 222. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 22 (discussing how the court in Saunders 
ignored the views of the larger community, which evidence suggests disfavor the 
informer (citing John Irwin & Donald R. Cressey, Thieves, Convicts and the 
Inmate Culture, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SUBCULTURES 64, 67 (David O. Arnold ed., 
1970))). 
 223. See supra Part II.B (discussing the “substantial and respectable 
minority,” or sectorial, test). 
 224. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 22 (explaining that a court may sacrifice 
the individual plaintiff in an attempt to advance certain social policy goals). 
 225. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing ways in which public policy and 
morality may overrule a morally repugnant community opinion); see also Baker, 
supra note 20, at 12 (noting that “moralist courts” may subjectively decide who 
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normative tests are not common in Anglo-American 
jurisdictions.226 Still, the alternative must be mentioned not only 
for the sake of analytical completeness, but also because our 
previous studies indicate that applying a normative test may 
sometimes be inevitable given the theoretical unsoundness of 
empirical community standards.227 
Applying a normative test raises at least three concerns. 
First, on the conceptual level, defamation law protects a 
relational interest, namely a person’s reputation.228 Reputation 
may be defined as the estimation of a person by other members of 
the relevant community.229 Thus, defamation law does not protect 
a person’s good name in the abstract, but the positive opinion 
that others have of the individual: “It is the actual community 
attitudes and opinions . . . which must serve as the standard, 
regardless of whether the court itself considers the particular 
group to be ‘right-thinking.’”230 Second, defamation law 
encroaches upon the freedom of speech.231 Imposing a limit 
                                                                                                     
falls within the category of “ordinary reasonable people”). 
 226. See supra Part II.A–B (explaining the normative and empirical 
constraints within the English and American tests). 
 227. Infra Part III.A. 
 228. See Burchell, supra note 11, at 183 (“Reputation is a relational 
interest . . . .” (citing G.L. Fricke, The Criterion of Defamation, 32 AUSTRALIAN 
L.J. 7, 8 (1958))); Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of 
the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1983) (explaining that 
defamation “remedies a wrongful disruption in the ‘relational interest.’”) (citing 
L. GREEN, CASES ON INJURIES TO RELATIONS 193–276 (1940)); Arthur L. Berney, 
Libel and the First Amendment—A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REV. 
1, 40–41 (1965); Leon Green, Relational Interests, 31 ILL. L. REV. 35, 36 (1936)). 
 229. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 12–13 (“Defamation, therefore, is a 
‘recipient-centered concept’ whose focus is on the views or opinions of others and 
their behavior in responding to the defamatory statement . . . Harm to 
reputation is thus a socially constructed injury, an injury defined by the 
response of others . . . .” (citing Marc A. Franklin & Daniel J. Bussel, The 
Plaintiff’s Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsoty, 25 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 825, 828 (1984); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation 
Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 693 (1986))). 
 230. Tommaney, supra note 15, at 641 (citing G.L. Fricke, The Criterion of 
Defamation, 32 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 7, 10 (1958)). 
 231. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 3 (“[S]cholars and judges have come to view 
defamation as a contest between the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of 
speech and the tort’s protection of reputation.”) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974)). 
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derived from actual perceptions of the community may be deemed 
more legitimate than imposing a limit based on the judge’s 
subjective views.232 Third, once the court opts for a normative 
test, it must determine the content of this test, which is not an 
easy task.233 A theory of permissible and impermissible 
expression is markedly different from a theory of permissible and 
impermissible conduct, so one cannot simply import the familiar 
tests for reasonableness in negligence law and plug them into the 
defamation law.234 One commentator suggested that an allusion 
to reasonableness may denote that a defendant is liable only if he 
or she can foresee that the statement will prejudice the 
plaintiff.235 However, we doubt that foreseeability alone can make 
a statement wrongful and provide a sufficient ground for liability. 
To be employed, a purely normative test must be justified, and 
the more esoteric or elitist the test, the greater the departure 
from prevailing views.236 
                                                                                                     
 232. See generally id. at 18–19 (noting that the “community segment 
determination” is often based on the judge’s own knowledge, beliefs, and 
experiences, rather than on the community’s beliefs (citing Daniel More, 
Informers Defamation and Public Policy, 19 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 503, 513 
(1989))). 
 233. Cf. Rudolf Alexander Mikus, The Reasonable Person in Substantive 
Canadian Criminal Law (Aug. 1995) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, The University 
of British Columbia), https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/ 
3900/ubc_1995-0450.pdf? (“Even if most people in a given society would agree 
that certain conduct was done ‘wickedly,’ the criteria for wickedness are not 
transparent . . . . Therefore, a purely normative test does not work without 
restricting criteria, but the very criteria are not visible.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 234. See Miller & Perry, Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 328, 348, 361–
63 (defining the various normative tests for reasonableness). 
 235. Baker, supra note 20, at 5 (explaining the view that the defendant 
should only be liable for interpretations of his or her publication by the 
reasonable person, as those are the interpretations that the defendant should 
have anticipated). 
 236. Cf. supra Part II.B.3 (noting that the decision in Byrne v. Deane was 
contrary to empirical data regarding the community’s view and therefore may 
need more analytical qualification). 
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III. Redefining Defamation 
A. Social Choice Theory 
1. The Model of Community Standards 
In this Part, we analyze the leading empirical tests for 
defamation—the general community test and the sectorial test—
with the aid of an economic model of community standards.237 In 
the model, which we have previously introduced in the contexts of 
negligence238 and good faith performance,239 community 
standards are methodically derived from the views of the 
individuals.240 We use the model to determine which derivation 
methods are plausible and to understand the relevant 
implications for the law of defamation.  
The model of community standards is drawn from the field of 
social choice theory, a branch of economics that arose in the 
1950s out of the pioneering work of Kenneth J. Arrow.241 Arrow 
sought to understand the origins of the economic concept of social 
welfare—the good of the society—and asked the following 
question: with which methods can we plausibly derive the social 
welfare from the welfare of the individuals who comprise the 
                                                                                                     
 237. For the formal presentation of the model, see Alan D. Miller, 
Community Standards, 148 J. ECON. THEORY 2696, 2697 (2013); Alan D. Miller, 
Essays on Law and Economics 38 (Apr. 6, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, California Institute of Technology), http://thesis.library.cal 
tech.edu/2283/1/Miller_Dissertation.pdf [hereinafter Miller, Essays] (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). The model was originally applied to 
community standards in the context of obscenity law. Id. 
 238. See Miller & Perry, Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 376–84 
(detailing a formal model of the reasonable person). 
 239. Miller & Perry, Good Faith, supra note 28, at 730–32 (explaining a 
formal community standards model used to apply the duty of good faith 
performance). 
 240. See Miller & Perry, Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 377 
(“Contemporary community standards . . . are often said to be an aggregate of 
the standards of individuals.” (citing United States v. Danley, 523 F.2d 369, 370 
(9th Cir. 1975))). 
 241. See id. at 373 (“[Arrow’s theorem] launched a new field of research in 
economics, social choice theory.”). See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL 
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963) (providing a more detailed 
explanation of Arrow’s pioneering theory). 
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society?242 Arrow sought to define “plausible” by requiring that 
the derivation method satisfy several axioms or properties.243 One 
axiom required that the society should strictly prefer one 
alternative to another when every individual strictly preferred 
the former to the latter.244 Another required that opinions about 
“irrelevant” alternatives should not affect society’s ranking of the 
relevant alternatives.245 A third required that society should not 
consider the opinion of one person—a dictator—to the exclusion of 
all others.246 Arrow showed through the use of an innovative 
mathematical theorem that no derivation method could possibly 
satisfy his axioms.247 There is no good way to define social 
welfare.  
Arrow’s result shocked the world of economics. The entire 
field of welfare economics, necessary for making policy 
recommendations, depended on the existence of a means of 
calculating social welfare.248 While all of the major methods were 
known to have problems, economists had assumed that these 
problems were not insurmountable and that a reasonable 
definition could be discovered over time.249 Arrow showed that 
                                                                                                     
 242. See ARROW, supra note 241, at 2 (considering the possibility of creating 
a “procedure for passing a set of known individual tastes to a pattern of social 
decision-making”); see also Miller & Perry, Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 
327 (“Arrow studied social welfare as a positive concept, in which the well-being 
of society derives from individual preferences.”). 
 243. See Miller & Perry, Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 373 (providing 
a description of these axioms). 
 244. See ARROW, supra note 241, at 25–26 (describing the positive 
correlation between social values and individual values). 
 245. See id. at 26–28 (describing the condition of the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives). 
 246. See id. at 30–31 (describing the condition of non-dictatorship). 
 247. See id. at 12–13 (describing the mathematical theorem); see also Miller 
& Perry, Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 373 (discussing the results and 
impact of Arrow’s research).   
 248. See Patrick Suppes, The Pre-History of Kenneth Arrow’s Social Choice 
and Individual Values, 25 SOC. CHOICE WELFARE. 319, 319 (2005) (“To most 
early writers . . . utility had been a quantity theoretically measurable; that is to 
say, a quantity which would be measurable if we had enough facts.”). 
 249. See id. (noting that most early writers believed utility could be 
measured if enough information was provided); see also Miller & Perry, 
Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 373 (“[Arrow’s theorem] cast doubt on the 
fundamental assumptions of welfare economics . . . .”). 
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there was a reason for the problems encountered by welfare 
economists: finding a defensible method is not merely difficult, it 
is impossible. For this discovery, Arrow was awarded the Nobel 
Prize in 1972.250 
The common law elements of the tort of defamation have 
something in common with the economic concept of social 
welfare.251 First, the empirical question of whether the statement 
has a tendency to lower the estimation of the plaintiff in the eyes 
of the community or a segment of it, which underlies the 
dominant standards for the determination of defamation,252 is 
analogous to the concept of social welfare in the sense that both 
depend on the beliefs, broadly understood, of a group of people—
the society.253 Second, both the economic definition of social 
welfare and the legal definition of defamation have been 
controversial. Still, the problems are by no means identical. 
Defamation is distinct from welfare. For this reason, our model of 
defamation, which is based on judgments, is very different from 
Arrow’s model of welfare, which was based on preferences. That 
there is no good way to combine preferences does not mean that it 
is impossible to define the standard for defamation.  
We apply a different argument from social choice—one 
constructed with legal standards in mind—to the problem of 
defamation. We begin by describing the model of community 
standards as applied to the general community test. The 
                                                                                                     
 250. See Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, (Oct. 25, 
1972), available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/ 
1972/press.html (“As perhaps the most important of Arrow's many contributions 
to welfare theory appears his ‘possibility theorem,’ according to which it is 
impossible to construct a social welfare function out of individual preference 
functions.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 251. See, e.g., Talbert v. United States, 932 F.2d 1064, 1066 (1991) (noting 
that the elements of the tort of defamation include a false and defamatory 
statement, an unprivileged publication, fault on the part of the publisher, and 
“either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the 
existence of special harm caused by the publication” (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977))). 
 252. See supra Part II.A–B (discussing the two dominant standards for the 
determination of defamation). 
 253. See Miller & Perry, Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 377 (noting 
that social welfare is an aggregate of individual welfare, based on informal 
observations of the individuals’ behaviors). 
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application of the model to the sectorial test will be illustrated 
after presentation of the main results. The model can be 
described as follows.  
First, there is a group of individuals. In the case of the 
general community test, this is a “geographically determined 
population.”254 Next, let us ask the question of whether the 
statement tends to lower the estimation of the plaintiff in the 
eyes of an individual. The answer to this question depends on the 
individual: a statement may lower the estimation of the plaintiff 
in the eyes of some individuals, but not others.255 In order to 
consider this problem, it will help if we begin by labeling an 
individual’s beliefs on this subject. We will simply call these “the 
individual’s beliefs about reputation.”  
Of course, whether a specific statement concerning one 
individual is defamatory in the eyes of another may depend on 
the context.256 Consider, for example, a false statement that the 
plaintiff aided the British during the Battle of the Brandywine in 
1777. Would this statement tend to harm the plaintiff’s 
reputation in the eyes of a particular individual in Philadelphia 
during that time? In general, the answer might be yes, but if the 
plaintiff was known to be a supporter of George III, the answer 
may be no. The effect that a statement may have on the plaintiff’s 
reputation depends on what is already known about the 
plaintiff.257 Thus, an individual’s beliefs about reputation can be 
described as the collection of statements that would tend to lower 
the plaintiff in the eyes of that individual given the context. We 
allow all possible beliefs, with but one restriction: regardless of 
the context, it must always be possible to make a nondefamatory 
statement about the plaintiff. That is, it should not be the case 
that every statement that one could possibly make about the 
                                                                                                     
 254. Baker, supra note 20, at 7. 
 255. See id. at 16–20 (describing the results of a study about reactions to 
defamatory speech among Australian adults). 
 256. See Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1026 (Colo. App. 1991) (discussing 
the role that context plays in the court’s analysis of defamatory statements). 
 257. See Jews for Jesus v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1101 (2008) (concerning 
the allegedly defamatory statement that the plaintiff had joined “Jews for 
Jesus”—a statement that could injure the plaintiff’s reputation only if a 
substantial and respectable minority knew that she was Jewish).  
2312 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2269 (2013) 
plaintiff would tend to harm his or her reputation. Of course, 
individuals do not tend to think about reputation in this way. 
Some people may rely on “gut instincts” or upon a particular 
normative philosophy. However, this distinction is largely 
immaterial. Because we consider all possible statements and all 
relevant contexts, our model provides a complete description of an 
individual’s beliefs about reputation.258 
Having formulated a model of individual beliefs about 
reputation, we then complete the model by describing the 
community’s belief about reputation. As with individual beliefs, 
the community belief is the collection of statements that tend to 
lower the plaintiff in the eyes of the community given the context, 
with the sole restriction being that it must always be possible to 
make a nondefamatory statement about the plaintiff. The 
community belief is methodically derived from individual beliefs; 
that is, it is completely determined by individual beliefs and the 
derivation method.259 
Having described a complete model of the general community 
test, we now study derivation methods. These are the essence of 
the definition of defamation—they specify how the community 
belief is defined with respect to the individuals’ beliefs.260 In 
particular, we look for natural axioms or properties that we 
would expect a derivation method to satisfy.261 We impose four 
such axioms. 
To understand the first axiom, consider a society with no 
disagreement—a world in which every individual agrees with 
every other individual about every possible statement in every 
relevant context.262 This society might be an incredibly boring 
                                                                                                     
 258. We make an implicit assumption that two beliefs are identical if they 
would always agree about whether a statement is defamatory. 
 259. See Miller, Essays, supra note 237, at 6 (“These individual standards 
are then aggregated to form a community standard.”).  
 260. See Miller & Perry, Good Faith, supra note 28, at 732 (describing the 
application of derivation methods in determining community). 
 261. See Miller, Essays, supra note 237, at 9 (“Social rules are studied 
through an axiomatic approach . . . .”). 
 262. See id. at 41 (“The first axiom, homogeneity, requires that if there is a 
single standard shared by every member of the community, then that standard 
is also the community standard.”). 
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place in which to live, but it would be easy to determine whether 
a statement is defamatory in this community. Our first axiom, 
“homogeneity,” requires that in this special case, the community 
belief must be identical to the commonly held individual belief. 
Axiom 1: Homogeneity. If all individuals have identical beliefs 
about reputation, then the community belief is identical to the 
commonly held belief. 263 
To explain the second axiom, we must first describe a natural 
way of comparing individual beliefs. We say that Amy is more 
“judgmental” than Bill if whenever a statement tends to harm the 
plaintiff’s reputation in Bill’s eyes, that statement also tends to 
harm the plaintiff’s reputation in Amy’s eyes. Along these lines, 
Amy can become more judgmental if she changes her mind and 
decides that, in some context, a statement that previously did not 
affect her view of the plaintiff now does in fact lower the plaintiff 
in her estimation. According to our second axiom, 
“responsiveness,” the community belief should respond to changes 
in individual beliefs: if all individuals become more judgmental, 
or do not change, then the community standard should also 
become more judgmental, or remain static.264 This can be thought 
of as a direction requirement: the community belief should 
change in the same direction as individual beliefs. 
Axiom 2: Responsiveness. If all individuals’ beliefs either 
(a) become more judgmental or (b) do not change, then the 
community belief either becomes more judgmental or does not 
change.265 
The next axiom stems from the notion that the law should 
treat all individuals equally.266 Amy’s belief is accorded neither 
more nor less respect than Bill’s belief. There are different ways 
of implementing this ideal in practice. We use the idea of a swap 
                                                                                                     
 263. Id. 
 264. See id. (“The second axiom, responsiveness, requires the community 
standard to ‘respond’ in the same direction (more permissive or less) as the 
community.”). 
 265. See id. (“If every individual standard becomes more permissive, then 
the community standard should become more permissive as well.”). 
 266. See id. (“[T]he law requires equal treatment of individuals.”). 
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of beliefs. Amy and Bill swap their beliefs if Amy’s new belief is 
identical to Bill’s old belief, and Bill’s new belief is identical to 
Amy’s old belief. In this case, the names attached to the beliefs 
have changed, but the collection of beliefs found within the 
society has not.267 Our third axiom, “anonymity,” requires the 
community belief to be invariant to a swap of beliefs. 
Axiom 3: Anonymity. A swap of individual beliefs does not affect 
the community belief.268 
The last axiom is based on the idea that the community belief 
should be based entirely on individual beliefs rather than on 
some preconceived notion of what is defamatory.269 If it is 
defamatory to label someone a “communist” but not defamatory 
to label that person a “fascist,” this must be because of a 
distinction made by the individuals and not because the 
distinction is built into the derivation method itself. Our fourth 
axiom, “neutrality,” requires that the derivation method must not 
favor some beliefs over others.270 
Axiom 4: Neutrality. The derivation method should be neutral 
between beliefs.271 
Homogeneity, responsiveness, anonymity, and neutrality are 
basic properties that any reasonable method of deriving the 
community belief should satisfy.272 Which derivation method 
satisfies these four basic properties? One such method is what we 
call the unanimity rule. Under this method, a statement made in 
a particular context is defamatory if, and only if, it would tend to 
lower the reputation of the plaintiff in the eyes of every single 
                                                                                                     
 267. See id. (“The third axiom, anonymity, requires that the aggregation rule 
not discriminate between individuals.”). 
 268. See id. at 10 (“An anonymity axiom requires that the qualification of 
individuals does not depend on their names.”). 
 269. See id. at 41 (“This axiom assumes that all judgments are subjective 
and is relevant when there is no method by which works can be objectively 
compared.”). 
 270. See id. (“The fourth axiom, neutrality, requires that the aggregation 
rule not discriminate, ex ante, between works.”). 
 271. Id. 
 272. See id. (“Each [axiom] is, in some way, a desirable property for any 
objective aggregation rule.”). 
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individual in the community.273 We do not claim that the 
unanimity rule is a good way to determine whether a statement 
is defamatory. Instead, we claim something else—not only does 
the unanimity rule satisfy the four axioms, but the unanimity 
rule is the only method to do so. Every other method of deriving a 
community belief fails in at least one of these four respects.274 
The theorem states that only the unanimity rule satisfies the 
four axioms. Why are all other rules flawed? A few methods, such 
as the majority rule, are invalid rules in our framework.275 It is 
possible that, for some context, every possible statement that 
could be made about a plaintiff would be found defamatory; this 
contradicts our assumption that it be possible to make a 
nondefamatory statement regardless of the context. This problem 
is illustrated in Figure 2. In the figure, each circle illustrates the 
set of statements that a particular person considers 
nondefamatory in a particular context. One can readily see that 
no statement is considered nondefamatory by a majority. 
Figure 2 
 
                                                                                                     
 273. See id. at 45 (“Under the ‘unanimity rule’, a work is considered obscene 
if it is considered obscene by every individual.”). 
 274. For the formal proof of this claim, see Miller, Essays, supra note 237, at 
45. Informal explanations of the proof are provided in Miller & Perry, 
Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 384, and in Miller & Perry, Good Faith, 
supra note 28, at 740–44. 
 275. See Miller & Perry, Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 388 
(discussing the flaws of the majority rule and why the unanimity rule is better 
for determining community beliefs). 
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There are variants of the majority rule that do not suffer from 
this problem. However, they violate one or more of the four 
axioms. For example, consider the majority–unanimity rule, 
under which a statement is deemed defamatory in a given context 
if the majority considers it so—unless every statement is 
considered defamatory in that context by some majority. In the 
case where every statement is considered defamatory by some 
majority, the majority–unanimity rule deems a statement 
defamatory only when everyone agrees that it is defamatory. 
Unlike the majority rule, the majority–unanimity rule is a valid 
rule; it cannot lead to the outcome in which all statements are 
defamatory. Still, it violates the responsiveness axiom: it is 
possible that every individual in the community will become less 
judgmental and that the community will become more 
judgmental as a consequence. 
We will now demonstrate that every valid rule other than the 
unanimity rule violates one or more of the four axioms. While the 
proof applies for any number of individuals and any number of 
contexts, to simplify the exposition, we will focus on the case of 
three people and a single context. At the outset, we consider two 
special cases. While each of these scenarios may be unlikely to 
occur in practice, they are helpful because they are very simple 
and can be used as reference points. 
The first such special case is that of complete agreement: 
every person in the society shares an identical belief about every 
statement in every context. This case is represented in Figure 3, 
in which the shaded circle represents the set of statements 
considered nondefamatory in the context. Because the three 
circles are identical, they overlap, so only one circle is shown. In 
this case, because of the homogeneity axiom, it is clear that the 
community will consider a statement nondefamatory if and only if 
it is within the circle. 
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Figure 3 
 
From this special case, we can show that if a statement is 
considered defamatory by everyone, then the community must 
also consider it defamatory. To see that this is the case, consider 
the set of views represented in Figure 4, and focus on a particular 
statement, S, considered defamatory by everyone. Next, suppose 
that everyone becomes less judgmental, so that everyone 
considers a statement nondefamatory if it is within the dotted 
line. We are now in the special case described in Figure 3. 
Because the opinions depicted in Figure 4 are more judgmental 
than those depicted in Figure 3, every statement deemed 
defamatory in the latter case must also have been deemed 
defamatory in the former. Statement S was defamatory in the 
case of Figure 3—because it is outside the circle—and 
consequently must be defamatory in the case of Figure 4. This 
proves that the community must consider a statement 
defamatory if an individual within the community considers it 
defamatory. 
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Figure 4 
 
The second special case is that of complete disagreement: 
every person considers some statements to be nondefamatory in 
the context, but no two people agree that any particular 
statement is nondefamatory. Furthermore, each person believes 
that the same proportion of statements is nondefamatory. This 
case is depicted in Figure 2, in which each of the circles—each 
depicting the set of statements that a particular individual 
considers nondefamatory—is of the same size, and no two circles 
overlap. Because this case is completely symmetric, the 
anonymity and neutrality axioms imply that every statement 
considered nondefamatory by someone must be treated in the 
same manner—either none may be defamatory or all must be. 
However, if all statements in the circles are defamatory, then 
every statement would be defamatory in this context, and this 
violates the assumption that some statements must be 
nondefamatory. Thus, in this special case, a statement is 
nondefamatory if, and only if, one individual considers it 
nondefamatory. 
It remains to be shown that, in general, a statement must be 
deemed nondefamatory whenever one or more people consider it 
nondefamatory. We begin with the general case, depicted in 
Figure 5. To prove this claim, we must show that statement T—
considered nondefamatory by one person—must be considered 
nondefamatory by the community. We make the following two 
observations about Figure 5. First, each individual is less 
judgmental in Figure 5 than that individual was in Figure 2. As a 
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consequence, the responsiveness axiom implies that any 
statement that is nondefamatory in Figure 2 must also be 
nondefamatory in Figure 5. Second, statement T is considered 
nondefamatory by the same individual in both cases. Because 
statement T is within one of the circles in Figure 2, we can 
conclude that it must have been deemed nondefamatory by the 
community in that case. By the responsiveness axiom, then, 
statement T must also have been nondefamatory in the case of 
Figure 5.  
Figure 5 
 
We have shown that any statement that is considered 
defamatory by all individuals must be deemed defamatory by the 
community, and that every statement considered nondefamatory 
by at least one individual must be deemed nondefamatory. This is 
precisely the unanimity rule.276 Thus, we have concluded our 
proof. 
2. A Critical Appraisal of the Empirical Tests 
The implication of the result in subpart A for the general 
community test is clearly negative. If it is true, as some 
commentators have claimed, that “no conduct is hated by all,”277 
                                                                                                     
 276. See Miller & Perry, Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 388 
(discussing and defining the unanimity rule). 
 277. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909). 
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or that “a community could never unanimously agree on the 
praiseworthiness or the blameworthiness of any description by 
which a man might be characterized,”278 then the unanimity rule 
would completely eviscerate the law of defamation. For any 
context, it would be practically impossible to find a statement 
that tended “to lower the plaintiff in the estimation” of every 
single individual in a particular jurisdiction.279 Communities are 
simply too diverse to meet this exacting standard. Proponents of 
the general community test, of course, have never defended the 
unanimity rule. Rather, they look to majoritarian norms or to the 
average person standard.280 However, our framework rejects both 
of these approaches. 
To apply the model to the sectorial test, we simply need to 
make one change—specifically to the first element of the model, 
the “group of people” from whose beliefs we derive the community 
belief. In the case of the general community test, this was 
determined to be the set of people living in a particular 
jurisdiction.281 In the case of a sectorial test, it will be a smaller 
group of people; it may be the community of amateur athletes,282 
doctors,283 Jews,284 Arabic speakers,285 truck drivers,286 or any 
                                                                                                     
 278. Note, Disgracing the Plaintiff, supra note 88, at 46. 
 279. White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 285 F.2d 512, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(citing Afro-Am. Publ’g Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 654 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1966)). 
 280. See Tolley v. J.S. Fry & Sons, Ltd., [1930] 1 K.B. 467, 479 (C.A.) (Eng.) 
(“Words . . . must tend to disparage him in the eyes of the average sensible 
citizen.”), rev’d [1931] A.C. 333 (H.L.). 
 281. See Baker, supra note 20, at 23 (discussing how juries are made up of 
the general community of the jurisdiction). 
 282. See, e.g., Tolley, [1930] 1 K.B. at 472–74 (discussing the plaintiff’s 
status as an amateur golfer and the role it played in determining defamation). 
 283. See, e.g., Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909) (discussing 
doctors). 
 284. See, e.g., Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1114–15 (Fla. 
2008) (discussing the applicable community standard can be a minority view 
and in this case, the Jewish community). 
 285. See, e.g., Arab News Network v. Al Khazen, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 118, 
[14] (Eng.) (“[W]hether one can have regard to a lowering of reputation amongst 
part of society, such as the Arab or Arab-speaking community, rather than 
amongst society generally.”). 
 286. See, e.g., Connelly v. McKay, 28 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328–29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1941) (discussing the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant’s words affected 
the plaintiff’s business from truck drivers). 
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other group that might be considered a substantial and 
respectable minority. The precise rule used to determine the 
membership of this group need not concern us at this point. 
Having made this simple change, the rest of the model 
applies in a straightforward way. The unanimity rule is still the 
unique rule that satisfies the axioms; however, it must be applied 
to the sector and not to the community as a whole. Thus we must 
ask, for example, whether a statement in a specific context would 
tend to lower the estimation of the plaintiff in the eyes of truck 
drivers. The sectorial test is likely to produce many of the same 
problems as the general community test. For example, while the 
majority of amateur athletes in 1930 might have considered it 
wrong to commercially exploit their fame,287 surely one or two 
might have seen nothing wrong with the practice. Similarly, 
while many Arabic speakers may have supported the Syrian 
government’s official policy toward Israel,288 it is quite clear that 
some Arabic speakers support negotiation toward an eventual 
peace settlement. 
While the sectorial test is likely to lead to many of the same 
problems as the general community test, it is clear that the main 
problem is attenuated, at least in a theoretical sense: the smaller 
the group, the larger the likelihood that all members of the group 
will consider a particular statement to have been defamatory. 
The extent of the attenuation of this problem depends on the 
minimal allowable size of the sector whose views the courts will 
consider relevant. For a substantial and respectable minority, 
this difference may not matter much. It will still be difficult to 
find many statements about which all members of the minority 
agree. However, as the size of the sector is allowed to become 
smaller, the probability of unanimous agreement increases. 
Smaller groups may be more cohesive, and unanimous opinions 
may be more likely to appear. In the extreme case, where each 
individual is a separate sector, this problem disappears entirely. 
                                                                                                     
 287. See Tolley v. J.S. Fry & Sons, Ltd., [1930] 1 K.B. 467, 467 (C.A.) (Eng.) 
(“[H]e had prostituted his reputation as an amateur golf-player for advertising 
purposes.”), rev’d [1931] A.C. 333 (H.L.). 
 288. See Arab News Network, [2001] EWCA at [4–7] (discussing the News 
Network’s publication, which described the reasons for the Vice President’s 
dismissal). 
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B. Cost–Benefit Analysis 
The Impact of Group Size. In this subpart, we analyze and 
compare three different rules: (1) the English general 
community test, under which a statement is defamatory if 
considered so by the general community;289 (2) the American 
sectorial test, under which a statement is defamatory if 
considered so by a substantial and respectable minority;290 and 
(3) the small group test, under which a statement is defamatory 
if considered so by a small group or a single individual.291 
Because it is unclear which method courts use to determine 
the community belief—or even whether an empirical test is in 
fact used as is claimed—we need to make an assumption about 
how a change in the allowable size of a group affects courts’ 
behavior. We assume that the scope of liability for defamation 
widens as the minimal size of the allowable group becomes 
smaller. This is so because in allowing claims of defamation 
based on smaller groups, we add to and do not preclude claims 
for defamation within larger groups. For example, in 
jurisdictions using the sectorial test, one may make a claim of 
defamation based on the views of the general community, and 
need not focus on the case of a specific “substantial and 
respectable minority.”292 
The Strategic Action Problem. There are reasons, separate 
from the theoretical problem outlined in subpart A, to prefer the 
American sectorial test to the English general community test 
and to prefer a small group test to both. The sectorial test does 
not allow claims that would be permitted under the small group 
test, and the general community test bars claims allowed by 
                                                                                                     
 289. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 16 (“British courts took the position that a 
statement must be defamatory according to the general consensus of 
society . . . .”). 
 290. See id. (“American courts . . . discern the relevant community in whose 
eyes the plaintiff was injured.” (citation omitted)). 
 291. See Tommaney, supra note 15, at 641 (“[M]ore harm can be done to a 
person’s reputation when he is defamed in the eyes of an extremely small 
group . . . .”). 
 292. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977). 
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both.293 The cost of not allowing these claims can be 
significant.294 
First, it is important to recognize that the harm to the 
plaintiff may be largely independent of the size of the relevant 
group. Individuals who are not public figures usually care about 
their reputations among relatively small groups.295 On a personal 
level, they care most about their reputation among friends, 
family, neighbors, and people who attend the same church or 
whose children attend the same schools.296 On a professional 
level, they may care about their reputation among colleagues, 
and their ability to retain their job, find a new one, or attract 
clients. A statement that is defamatory among a small group may 
be just as harmful as one that is defamatory among the general 
population. 
Second, if the statement in question is not found to be 
defamatory because either the sectorial test or the general 
community test is used, then the defendant has no incentive to 
take the proper amount of care to prevent real and serious harm 
to the plaintiff’s reputation. This is especially clear when the 
publisher of the statement knows, or could discover at a low cost, 
that the statement tends to harm the plaintiff’s reputation in the 
relevant group. In this case, a publisher will not exert a 
reasonable level of effort to ensure that the defamatory statement 
                                                                                                     
 293. See supra Part II.A–B (discussing the differences between successful 
claims under the sectorial test and the general community test). 
 294. See supra Part I (discussing the possibility of strategic action and the 
chilling effect of the sectorial test and the general community test); see also 
Tommaney, supra note 15, at 641 (“[M]ore harm can be done to a person’s 
reputation when he is defamed in the eyes of an extremely small group, or even 
in the eyes of only one person . . . .”). 
 295. See Weiner v. Time & Life Inc., 507 N.Y.S.2d 784, 785 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1986) (“[I]t is obvious that a person can only be injured in his community, i.e. 
with those who know him personally or by reputation . . . .”); Tommaney, supra 
note 15, at 641 (“[M]ore harm can be done to a person’s reputation when he is 
defamed in the eyes of an extremely small group, or even in the eyes of only one 
person . . . . For example, if a man is defamed in the eyes of his employer, his 
relatives, or his close friends, considerable damage may be done . . . .”). 
 296. See Tommaney, supra note 15, at 641 (explaining how people value the 
opinions of certain people more than others depending on the relationship). 
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is truthful or to check, when reasonable, whether the statement 
might be harmful to the plaintiff’s reputation.297 
Third, this problem becomes more extreme when considering 
the case of intentional defamation. Individuals may strategically 
make a false statement with the goal of inflicting injury to the 
reputation of another, having an economic or a psychological 
motivation. The harm from this malicious behavior can be 
significant. A carefully calculated statement may only harm the 
plaintiff’s reputation within a small group of individuals, yet 
might destroy the plaintiff’s marriage or career. The problem is 
not simply that the plaintiff may not recover, but rather that the 
defendant has a blank check to harm the reputation of a 
perceived rival, so long as the defendant can find a statement 
that is only harmful within a subset of the plaintiff’s immediate 
circle of family, friends, colleagues, and acquaintances. Put 
differently, individuals have no incentive to take precautions 
when they know that a statement tends to harm the potential 
plaintiff’s reputation within a group that is smaller than the 
minimum recognized by the applicable test. In this case, a 
strategic defamer can act with impunity. 
While the problems of negligent and intentional defamation 
are distinct, in general it is clear that they exist in close 
proximity to each other. That is, neither is a serious problem 
under the small group test, but both are very significant problems 
under the sectorial test, and both are even more severe under the 
general community test. To simplify the discussion, we will give a 
common name to both: the strategic action problem. 
The Chilling Effect. While the small group test would 
eliminate the theoretical problem outlined in subpart A and the 
problem of strategic action, Anglo-American courts do not allow 
actions for defamation based upon reputational harm in very 
small segments of society.298 Under American law, the sector 
                                                                                                     
 297. Cf. Weiner, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 785 (“[I]t would be manifestly unfair and 
unworkable to require Time, a magazine of nationwide scope with a 
heterogeneous audience, to consider each small enclave within various 
communities whenever it writes about a person.”). 
 298. See, e.g., Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909) (applying the 
substantial and respectable minority test); Marcoux-Norton v. Kmart Corp., 907 
F. Supp. 766, 778 (D. Vt. 1993) (“[T]he community may be a substantial 
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must be “a substantial and respectable minority,”299 and may not 
be a “single individual or a very small group of persons.”300  
A possible explanation for this discrepancy can be found in 
the aforementioned case of Weiner v. Time & Life, Inc. In this 
case, the court refused to hold the defendant liable for an 
allegedly defamatory article in Time magazine, which described 
the plaintiff as violating the rules of his religious community.301 
The court reasoned that it would be unfair and unworkable to 
expect a national magazine with a heterogeneous audience to 
consider “each small enclave within various communities 
whenever it writes about a person.”302 In economic terms, 
imposing liability in this case would create high publication costs, 
which would require the publisher to devote a significant amount 
of resources to ensuring that its reporting would not be 
considered offensive in any small community.303 In addition, 
these increased costs would likely lead to a chilling effect by 
reducing and decreasing the quantity and quality of published 
material.304 The cost of precaution—the resources devoted to 
                                                                                                     
respectable group, even though only a minority of the total community.”); Tolley 
v. J.S. Fry & Sons, Ltd., [1930] 1 K.B. 467, 479 (C.A.) (Eng.) (applying the 
general community test), rev’d, [1931] A.C. 333 (H.L.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977) (“It is enough that the communication would tend 
to prejudice him in the eyes of a substantial and respectable minority . . . .”). 
 299. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977). 
 300. Id. 
 301. Weiner v. Time & Life Inc., 507 N.Y.S.2d 784, 784–85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1986). 
 302. Id. at 785. 
 303. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[A] rule of 
strict liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy 
of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship.”); N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (“A rule compelling the critic of official 
conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions . . . leads to a 
comparable ‘self-censorship.’”); Weiner v. Time & Life Inc., 507 N.Y.S.2d 784, 
785 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (“[I]t would be manifestly unfair and unworkable to require 
Time, a magazine of nationwide scope with a heterogeneous audience, to 
consider each small enclave within various communities whenever it writes 
about a person.”). 
 304. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (“[P]unishment of error runs the risk of 
inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed 
freedoms of speech and press. . . . [A] rule of strict liability that compels a 
publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may 
lead to intolerable self-censorship.”); Sullivan, 376 at 279 (“A rule compelling 
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determining whether a statement is defamatory—and the chilling 
effect are interrelated, but distinct. Nevertheless, because they 
exist within close proximity—one is a problem when the other is a 
problem—we will simplify the discussion by referring to them 
collectively as the “chilling effect.” We believe that any loss in 
accuracy will be made up for by an increase in clarity. 
Generally, as the minimal size of the allowable group 
becomes smaller, the chilling effect is exacerbated.305 The cost of 
determining whether a statement is defamatory in the eyes of the 
general community is relatively low; individuals can be presumed 
to be familiar with the community as a whole.306 We may expect 
that it is somewhat more costly to determine whether a 
statement is defamatory in the eyes of a substantial and 
reasonable minority. Individuals often have some degree of 
familiarity with the larger subgroups in the population, but less 
than they do with the community as a whole. It is much more 
costly to determine whether a statement is defamatory in the 
eyes of a small group. An individual will be familiar with the 
prevailing perceptions in small groups only if he or she has 
learned about them from personal interaction with members of 
these groups or with the potential plaintiff, or through 
coincidental exposure to relevant information. 
England versus the United States. Having elucidated the 
economic factors relevant when choosing between the various 
rules, we seek to understand this central question: how can we 
account for the divergence among the common law countries? 
Why did England adopt the general community test?307 Why is 
the sectorial test popular in the United States? In both countries, 
                                                                                                     
the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual 
assertions . . . leads to . . . ‘self-censorship.’ Allowance of the defense of truth, 
with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false 
speech will be deterred.”). 
 305. Cf. Weiner, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 785 (“[I]t would be manifestly unfair and 
unworkable to require Time, a magazine of nationwide scope with a 
heterogeneous audience, to consider each small enclave within various 
communities whenever it writes about a person.”). 
 306. See Baker, supra note 20, at 8 (suggesting that the general community 
test relies upon standards that are common to society generally). 
 307. See supra Part II.A (discussing the English adoption of the general 
community test). 
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common law judges faced a tradeoff between the problem of 
strategic action, on the one hand, and the chilling effect, on the 
other. The English general community test suffers from a severe 
strategic action problem, but a very mild chilling effect, while 
under the American sectorial test, both the chilling effect and the 
strategic action problem are moderate.308 What explains this 
difference? Were English courts more concerned with the chilling 
effect than American courts? Were American courts more 
concerned with the strategic action problem than English courts? 
Or was it a combination of these two factors? 
We suspect that the first explanation is more likely. The 
extent of the chilling effect depends on how likely individuals are 
to know about smaller groups. Because England once had a very 
homogeneous population,309 it is possible that the chilling effect 
which would come from the adoption of the sectorial test would 
have been quite severe. On the other hand, the United States 
population had already become relatively diverse by the time that 
American courts adopted the sectorial test.310 We do not have any 
reason to believe that the strategic action problem would have 
been more significant in the United States than in England. 
There is no evidence that Americans are more likely to want to 
harm their rivals or are more likely to have the skills necessary 
to do so through defamatory speech. 
As a result, while it would have been costly—in terms of the 
chilling effect—to adopt the sectorial test, this cost would have 
been much smaller in the United States than in England. The 
benefits—in terms of the strategic action problem—of adopting 
the sectorial test would have been similar in both countries. As a 
consequence, the sectorial test was relatively more desirable in 
the United States, and it seems reasonable that American courts 
made this choice. 
                                                                                                     
 308. Supra Part III.B.1–2. 
 309. See Riesman, supra note 91, at 1301 (discussing homogeneity in 
England); Burchell, supra note 11, at 183 (explaining that the general 
community test fits England, where the population is relatively homogeneous). 
 310. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL 
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, PART 1, at 22 (1975) 
(providing census information delineated by sex, race, residence, age, and 
nativity by region between 1790 and 1970). 
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Caveats. While our analysis shows that both sets of choices—
that of the English courts to adopt the general community test, 
and that of the American courts to adopt the sectorial test—may 
have been justifiable at the time in terms of the cost–benefit 
tradeoff described, several notes of caution are in order. 
First, the theoretical model of community standards suggests 
that if the element of defamatoriness is empirically founded—
that is, if the tendency to harm one’s reputation is based on an 
actual tendency and is not a legal fiction—then only the 
unanimity rule satisfies the basic axioms that we have 
identified.311 The unanimity rule is not a practically feasible rule 
under either the general community test or the sectorial test, 
although it is slightly less feasible under the former.312 Because it 
seems clear that the unanimity rule is not used in practice, we 
must draw the conclusion that courts are not using a coherent or 
consistent method to determine the views of the community. That 
there is a flaw in the method used does not mean that it should 
necessarily be discarded, as it is possible that whatever courts do 
in practice under a particular rule may be preferable from the 
perspective of a normative goal such as welfare maximization. 
However, it should be understood that both the general 
community test and the sectorial test are based on a legal fiction 
and cannot represent the community belief in any meaningful 
sense. 
Second, while we argue that the courts in both countries may 
have made the best choice, we are assuming that the courts were 
limited to the three possible rules discussed here. In a broader 
sense, neither the English general community test nor the 
American sectorial test is fully optimal. Both suffer from the 
problem of strategic action. However, it is plausible that the 
chilling effect which would be created by adopting the small 
group test would be worse. In addition, it is important to note 
that none of these tests removes the chilling effect entirely. 
                                                                                                     
 311. See supra Part III.A.2 (explaining that the model of community 
standards’ four axioms are only satisfied when “a statement made in a 
particular context is defamatory if, and only if, it would tend to lower the 
reputation of the plaintiff in the eyes of every single individual in the 
community”). 
 312. Supra Part III.A.2.  
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C. Constitutionalized Defamation 
In the past fifty years, American defamation law has 
dramatically changed following a set of Supreme Court decisions 
that interpreted the U.S. Constitution to require plaintiffs to 
prove additional elements as part of a defamation claim.313 The 
most relevant of these cases is Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., in 
which the Supreme Court held that states may not hold 
defendants liable for defamation without a showing of fault.314 We 
argue that Gertz should be interpreted as allowing liability only if 
the defendant was aware, or had reason to be aware, that the 
statement was defamatory. Our argument can be broken into two 
parts. First, we argue that the Constitution requires fault with 
respect to both the accuracy of the statement and its defamatory 
nature.315 Second, we maintain that fault with respect to the 
defamatory nature of a statement is primarily a question of 
knowledge.316 
In general, there are two main interpretations of the fault 
requirement that we have found in caselaw and legal literature. 
First, the Constitution may require fault with respect only to the 
accuracy of the statement.317 In this setting, one must prove that 
                                                                                                     
 313. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that 
liability for defamation requires fault); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 
155 (1967) (“We . . . hold that a ‘public figure’ who is not a public official may 
also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood . . . , on a showing of highly 
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of 
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.”); 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (concluding that an 
action for defamation cannot be brought by a public official if the false 
statements were made without the plaintiff’s knowledge of the falsity or the 
plaintiff’s reckless disregard for their truth).  
 314. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 (“We hold that, so long as they do not impose 
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate 
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood 
injurious to a private individual.”). 
 315. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1970) (indicating that 
liability for defamation requires that the defendant “knows that the statement 
is false and that it defames” the plaintiff). 
 316. See id. (requiring the defendant to know that the statement is both 
false and defamatory). 
 317. See, e.g., Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008) 
(requiring fault only as to the falsity of the statement). 
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the defendant failed to act reasonably in determining whether the 
statement was true.318 Second, the Constitution may require fault 
with respect to both the accuracy of the statement and its 
defamatory nature.319 In this case, one must prove that the 
defendant failed to act reasonably in determining whether the 
statement was both false and harmful.320 A defendant who 
reasonably believed that the statement was not defamatory may 
be liable under the former interpretation, but not under the 
latter.  
A third potential interpretation, that the Constitution might 
require fault with respect only to the defamatory nature of the 
statement, has not taken root. Part of the reason for this is that 
the defendant’s knowledge of the statement’s falsity or lack 
thereof has been deemed central to the case.321 The defendant in 
Gertz claimed to have not known that the statements were 
false,322 while it seems to have been uncontroverted that they 
were understood to be defamatory. In addition, while there may 
be value in the publication of statements which are defamatory 
but true,323 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, emphasized 
                                                                                                     
 318. See, e.g., id. (“Defamation has . . .  five elements: (1) publication; 
(2) falsity; (3) actor must act with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the 
falsity on a matter concerning a public official, or at least negligently on a 
matter concerning a private person; (4) actual damages; and (5) statement must 
be defamatory.”). 
 319. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977) (“One . . . is 
subject to liability, if, but only if, he (a) knows that the statement is false and 
that it defames the other, (b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters, or 
(c) acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.”). 
 320. See id. (requiring that the defendant know that the statements are 
false and defamatory, that the defendant acted in reckless disregard, or that the 
defendant acted negligently in failing to realize the statements’ falsity and 
defamatory nature). 
 321. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) 
(requiring knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for falsity for defamation of 
a public figure). 
 322. See Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 328 (“The editor denied 
any knowledge of the falsity of the statements concerning petitioner and stated 
that he had relied on the author’s reputation and on his prior experience with 
the accuracy and authenticity of the author’s contributions to American 
Opinion.”). 
 323. Cf. Note, Developments in the Law of Defamation, supra note 16, at 932  
[T]here is no civil liability for the publication of a true statement even 
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that “there is no constitutional value in false statements of 
fact,”324 even if these facts are not defamatory. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts has endorsed the second 
position, namely that the fault requirement should be understood 
with respect to both the falsity and the defamatory nature of the 
statement.325 However, this issue is far from settled, as many 
jurisdictions seem to follow the first approach.326 We argue that 
the Restatement’s position is more tenable for several reasons. 
First, Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Gertz, held that 
States may not impose liability without fault with respect to the 
publication of a “defamatory falsehood injurious to a private 
individual,”327 implying that the defamatory nature of the 
statement is part of the analysis. 
Second, the two questions of whether there is fault with 
respect to the falsity and defamatoriness of a statement are not 
separable. On the one hand, we expect someone with an inkling 
that a statement might harm an individual’s reputation if false to 
very carefully check the veracity of the claim. On the other hand, 
if a person does not know that a statement, if false, could hurt an 
individual’s reputation, then we do not expect that person to 
exert nearly as much effort in verifying that the statement is 
true. 
Third, while the first two interpretations are conceptually 
distinct, the practical implications are limited by the fact that 
American courts only allow for liability when the statement is 
defamatory in the eyes of the general community or a substantial 
and respectable minority.328 The larger the size of this group, the 
                                                                                                     
though it is uttered maliciously and injures a person’s reputation. . . . 
[A] person has no right to a better reputation than he would have if 
all the facts about him were known, and . . . members of the public 
have an interest in knowing the truth about others with whom they 
may associate.”  
(footnote omitted). 
 324. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340. 
 325. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977). 
 326. See, e.g., Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008) 
(requiring fault with respect to the accuracy of the statement). 
 327. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. 
 328. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1970) (explaining 
the substantial and respectable minority standard). 
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less likely it is that an individual could reasonably, but 
incorrectly, come to the conclusion that a defamatory statement is 
nondefamatory. Differences between the interpretations would 
only be relevant when dealing with smaller groups that barely fit 
into the category of “substantial and respectable.” It is possible 
that courts have varied these boundaries to avoid holding 
defendants liable when they are perceived to have acted 
reasonably. For example, in Weiner v. Time & Life, Inc., the court 
discussed whether the defendant could be expected to know that 
the statement in question was defamatory among highly orthodox 
Jews in upper Manhattan in determining whether highly 
orthodox Jews in this area comprised a substantial and 
respectable minority.329 
Furthermore, we maintain that fault with respect to the 
defamatory nature of a statement is primarily a question of 
knowledge. To show that this must be the case, we return to our 
argument that the questions of fault with respect to falsity and 
defamatoriness are inseparable. While we expect reasonable 
persons to exert some effort in determining whether a statement 
is accurate, we do not generally expect reasonable persons to 
inquire as to whether a statement is defamatory. There is not 
necessarily anything wrong with making a defamatory statement 
if that statement is factually true.330 However, the level of effort 
that a person should exert to verify the accuracy of a statement 
depends on what the person knows about the amount of harm 
which could result from a false statement, that is, on whether the 
person knows the statement is defamatory.  
The fault requirement is important because it largely 
counteracts most of the chilling effect. We noted in Part II.B that 
the chilling effect has two components.331 First, publishers may 
expend too much effort in determining whether a statement is 
                                                                                                     
 329. Weiner v. Time & Life, Inc., 507 N.Y.S.2d 784, 784–85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1986). 
 330. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“[There is] a 
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government 
and public officials.”). 
 331. Supra Part II.B. 
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false and defamatory.332 Second, publishers may publish less as a 
result of these increased costs and the damages that may be 
imposed for honest mistakes.333 The fault requirement 
substantially changes the analysis. Publishers will be liable only 
if at fault; thus, they only need to expend reasonable effort in 
verifying statements.334 Moreover, under the fault requirement, 
publishers that act reasonably will not be required to pay 
damages when an honest mistake is made—that is, when a false 
defamatory statement is published in spite of their reasonable 
efforts.335 This effect of the fault requirement on the chilling effect 
is not a mere coincidence, but was the primary intention of the 
Supreme Court. Both New York Times v. Sullivan and Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc. are justified in terms of their effect on self-
censorship.336  
                                                                                                     
 332. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[A] rule of 
strict liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy 
of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship.”); Sullivan, 376 
U.S. at 279 (“A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the 
truth of all his factual assertions . . . leads to a comparable ‘self-censorship.’”); 
Weiner, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 785 (“[I]t would be manifestly unfair and unworkable to 
require Time, a magazine of nationwide scope with a heterogeneous audience, to 
consider each small enclave within various communities whenever it writes 
about a person.”). 
 333. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (“[P]unishment of error runs the risk of 
inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed 
freedoms of speech and press. . . . [A] rule of strict liability that compels a 
publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may 
lead to intolerable self-censorship.”); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (“A rule 
compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual 
assertions . . . leads to . . . ‘self-censorship.’ Allowance of the defense of truth, 
with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false 
speech will be deterred.”). 
 334. See Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008) 
(requiring knowledge or reckless disregard as to falsity for matters concerning a 
public official, or at least negligence for matters concerning a private person). 
 335. See id. (requiring knowledge or reckless disregard as to falsity for 
matters concerning a public official, or at least negligence for matters 
concerning a private person). 
 336. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (“[P]unishment of error runs the risk of 
inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed 
freedoms of speech and press . . . . [A] rule of strict liability that compels a 
publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may 
lead to intolerable self-censorship.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
279 (1964) (“A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the 
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Thus, as a result of the fault requirement introduced in 
Gertz, the analysis of the three rules changes. The small group 
test is now preferable to both the sectorial test and the general 
community test. First, because the chilling effect has been 
negated by the fault requirement, the small group test allows us 
to eliminate the problem of strategic action without creating a 
significant chilling effect. The American sectorial test and the 
English general community test, on the other hand, suffer from a 
serious strategic action problem. Second, the small group test is 
not subject to the theoretical problem described in Part II.A. In 
the present legal reality, the adoption of the small group test—
allowing claims of defamation for statements that would be 
considered defamatory in the eyes of small groups or 
individuals—could improve both the economic efficiency and the 
internal consistency of the law. 
IV. Conclusion 
This Article provides an answer to the most fundamental 
question in defamation law: what should make a particular 
statement defamatory? The inquiry involves two steps. In the 
interpretive step, the court determines whether the allegedly 
defamatory statement was true, and in the evaluative step, the 
court determines whether the statement, properly interpreted, 
had the tendency to harm the plaintiff’s reputation. This Article 
focuses on the latter. Part III explains that the definition of 
defamatoriness in common law jurisdictions is essentially 
empirical, and distinguishes between the two leading tests—the 
English test and the American test.  
Part II.A discusses how English courts have embraced the 
general community test, whereby a statement is defamatory if 
considered so by the public at large. The traditional English test, 
which relies on empirical observations, at least de jure, consists of 
a normative constraint. A statement is defamatory if considered 
so by the general community, taking into account only the views 
                                                                                                     
truth of all his factual assertions . . . leads to a comparable ‘self-censorship.’ 
Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the 
defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred.”). 
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of “right thinking” people. Thus, an English court will pay no 
heed to a community standard if it does not comply with the 
normative threshold. 
Part II.B illustrates that American courts have generally 
endorsed the sectorial test, whereby a statement is defamatory if 
considered so by a substantial and respectable minority. This test 
integrates two constraints. On the quantitative level, although a 
statement can be defamatory if it prejudices a person in the eyes 
of a minority, that minority must be substantial. A single 
individual or a very small group of persons with peculiar views 
will not suffice. This qualification precludes ex definitio the small 
group test. On the qualitative level, a statement may be 
defamatory if considered so by a mere minority, provided that it 
is a respectable one. Accordingly, the fact that a person’s 
reputation may be injured in the eyes of a substantial minority is 
insufficient. The court will reject the sectorial standard if it does 
not comply with the normative threshold. Part II.C discusses 
purely normative tests for defamation for the sake of 
completeness, although they are uncommonly used. 
Part III conducts two separate economic analyses of the tests 
for defamation. In the first analysis, we use a theorem from the 
economic field of social choice to study the relationship between 
the view of the community and the views of the individuals who 
comprise the community. We explain that if the former is derived 
from the latter, and the derivation satisfies several normatively 
desirable properties, then the derivation must be done according 
to the unanimity rule. A statement may be considered 
defamatory only when all individuals in the relevant community 
consider it so. Because this rule is implausible except in the case 
of the small group test, it suggests that both the English general 
community test and the American sectorial test lack a solid 
theoretical foundation. 
In the second analysis, we study the costs and benefits 
associated with the various tests. We demonstrate that the 
important costs involved are the chilling effect and the problem of 
strategic action, and that the American sectorial test may have 
constituted a reasonable tradeoff between these concerns. We 
then argue that the fault requirement introduced in Gertz should 
apply to both the falsity and the defamatory nature of the 
statement. Under this interpretation, the fault requirement 
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ameliorates the chilling effect. As a result, the American sectorial 
test is no longer optimal, and it would be preferable from the 
standpoint of economic efficiency to adopt the small group test in 
its place. 
